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ARTICLES
PUBLIC CHOICE, PUBLIC INTEREST, AND THE SOFT
DRINK INTERBRAND COMPETITION ACT: TIME TO
DERAIL THE "ROOT BEER EXPRESS"?
ALLAN W. VESTAL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Are Congressional representatives the rent-seeking egoists upon
whom the public choice model depends,' or the selfless pursuers of
public good upon whom the public interest analysis rests?2 They
are, of course, neither-a fact well recognized when one gets past
the caricatures of the public choice debate.3 In truth, everyone
* Assistant Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A., Yale Univer-
sity, 1976; J.D., Yale University, 1979. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
the Frances Lewis Law Center, Washington and Lee University; the thoughtful and helpful
critiques of Randy Bezanson, Uncas McThenia, David Millon, and Brian Murchison; and
the valuable research contributions of Linda Foster, Charlie Hoffman, and Chong Kim.
1. See Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for
the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REV. 179, 180 (1988).
2. See Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public
Choice Model, 74 VA. L. REV. 471, 472 n.8 (1988) (briefly describing public interest analysis).
Professor Macey actually criticizes public interest analysis for its "naive view of legislators
as public-regarding guardian angels who meet periodically to right the wrongs of society."
Id. at 476.
3. Public choice theorists often caricature the public interest argument and exaggerate
the extent to which public choice considerations, as distinct from the ends to which the
analysis is put, are novel. For example, Professors Brennan and Buchanan do not claim that
the private interest of legislators is the sole motivation for their actions: "[A]Ithough we do
not believe that narrow self-interest is the sole motive of political agents, or that it is neces-
sarily as relevant a motive in political as in market settings, we certainly believe it to be a
significant motive." Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 1, at 181. They argue that it is the
public interest analysis that is flawed, by a presumption that pursuit of the "public interest"
is adequate to model legislative behavior:
This [acceptance of narrow self-interest as a significant motive] differentiates
our approach from the alternative model, implicit in conventional welfare eco-
nomics and widespread in conventional political science, that political agents
can be satisfactorily modeled as motivated solely to promote the "public inter-
est," somehow conceived. That model we, along with all our public choice col-
leagues, categorically reject.
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knows that the world is neither black nor white, and legislator be-
havior is more complex than either the public choice or public in-
terest model, in its simplest form, can accommodate. Congress, it
turns out, is comprised of individuals, each of whom is in part a
shameless rent seeker, in part an estimable defender of the public
interest, and occasionally both at the same time.
The public choice debate has been long on broad theory and re-
markably short on the reality testing of case examinations.4 This
Article is a preliminary discussion of one piece of legislation, the
Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act' (Soft Drink Act), a piece
of antitrust legislation narrowly targeted but of immense impor-
tance within its range of coverage. This discussion is not an at-
tempt to prove or disprove the public choice model; although I
Id. Of course, in making their point, Professors Brennan and Buchanan shift the focus from
what is descriptively accurate to what is useful in establishing a model. If it is true that the
public interest model is built on the flawed assumption that legislator behavior is motivated
solely by the public interest, then it is also true that the Brennan and Buchanan public
choice model is equally flawed, because in moving from an empirical description to the crea-
tion of a model, Brennan and Buchanan discard the complication of a multimotivation uni-
verse in favor of the simplicity of a one-dimensional legislator. The resulting model is ana-
lytically more manageable, but it is not descriptively accurate. "We model man as a wealth
maximizer, not because this model is necessarily the most descriptive empirically, but be-
cause we seek a set of rules that will work well independently of the behavioral postulates
introduced." Id. at 188. Thus, the two questions, what is descriptively accurate and what is
a useful model, are not squarely joined.
Those who challenge public choice theory seem somewhat less inclined to collapse the
distinction between reality and a model of reality and deal in easily dismissed caricature.
See, e.g., Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 223 (1988).
4. The case studies that have been done have been criticized. See Kelman, supra note 3,
at 204-05. Professor Kelman has complained that public choice
scholars frequently support their preconception with empirical studies that are
so off the point and unpersuasive that a reasonably skeptical outsider must
ultimately feel that she is dealing with a cult, a group that reassures itself with
ritual incantation of familiar homilies that appear to be utter mumbo jumbo to
nonbelievers.
Id.; see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65
TEx. L. REV. 873, 895-96 (1987) (criticizing generally the factual and causation analyses of-
fered in support of economic theory of legislation). There are examples, however, of creative
and exploratory public choice analyses that look at the moderate level of explanatory power
provided by public choice analysis. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets and
Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931, 1957-91 (1991) (presenting an alternative public choice ex-
planation for the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3503 (1988).
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strongly disagree with many of the policy conclusions that public
choice theorists have drawn, I find immersion in "the icy water of
egotistical calculation ' 6  interesting and helpful-to a point.
Rather, this discussion focuses on the Soft Drink Act and uses the
public choice and public interest analytical models to help under-
stand how the statute was enacted and whether it should now be
repealed.
Because one cannot profitably study legislation of this type with-
out having a basic understanding of the industry involved, this Ar-
ticle starts with a capsule history of the soft drink industry. The
discussion then asks a preliminary question: how well do the public
choice and public interest analyses square with passage of the stat-
ute? I conclude that either a public choice or a public interest
model can plausibly explain the Soft Drink Act, but the explana-
tion sounding in public choice is the more convincing of the two.
Having concluded that both models are of some value as explana-
tory vehicles, the discussion proceeds to ask, using each approach,
what should be the future of the statute. The Article ends with
some more general conclusions about the usefulness of the public
choice model and the soundness of some policy conclusions taken
from the constitutionalist public choice position.
II. THE SOFT DRINK ACT
The story of the soft drink industry begins with the unpreten-
tious refillable glass bottle, for that container is the key to the his-
torical organization of the industry. Understanding the industry's
organization permits one to see how legal and economic forces con-
verged in the 1970s to make the Soft Drink Act of critical impor-
tance to the industry, and why developments in the industry over
the last decade ought to call into question the future of the Soft
Drink Act.
A. Structural and Antitrust History of the Soft Drink Industry
Three central points put the organization of the soft drink in-
dustry into perspective for our purposes. First, the industry grew
6. KARL MARx & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 62 (Washington Square
Press 1968) (1848).
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using refillable containers, which require relatively dense produc-
tion facilities.7 Second, the soft drink industry historically has
been vertically segregated, with the national parent company pro-
ducing the proprietary syrup base and independent bottlers at the
local level producing the finished soft drink product." Third, the
use of refillable containers and independent bottlers in turn re-
quired the creation of exclusive marketing territories.9
The pharmacist who originally formulated Coca-Cola marketed
the soft drink at the soda fountain in his drug store and later sold
his proprietary syrup to other druggists for in-store consumption. 1°
Not until the development of the machine-blown bottle and the
invention of the crown cap in the last decade of the nineteenth
century was the stage set for the modern soft drink bottling busi-
ness.1 Because the bottler had to deliver the product and pick up
the empty used bottles for refilling, and because the cost of trans-
porting the finished product over long distances would have been
prohibitive, production efficiencies demanded that the soft drink
distribution system be rather dense, with a large number of bot-
tling plants located relatively close to their respective markets. 2
One account of early operations set the boundaries of each individ-
ual territory at the distance a horse and driver could cover conve-
niently in one day; those territories later increased somewhat in
size to account for the use of motor vehicles. 13 Even today, the effi-
7. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
10. PAT WATTERS, COCA-COLA: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 5-8 (1978).
11. STEPHEN N. TCHUDI, SODA POPPERY: THE HISTORY OF SoFT DRINKS IN AMERICA 19
(1986). The use of returnable bottles dates from the mid-1890s. BEVERAGE WORLD, COKE'S
FIRST 100 YEARS 124-26 (1986) [hereinafter COKE'S FIRST 100 YEARS].
12. "[Asa Candler, the sole owner of Coca-Cola in 1887,] felt it would be too expensive to
bottle Coca-Cola in Atlanta, then ship it all over the country. Soft drinks are mostly water,
and water is both heavy and expensive to ship." TCHUDI, supra note 11, at 29.
13. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 585 (1975) (initial decision) (noting the "vehicle-round-
trip-in-one-day measurement" used by the Coca-Cola Company in setting its territorial
boundaries), rev'd, 91 F.T.C. 517, 607 (1978) (final decision), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Deposition of Walter S. Mack, former President of the Pepsi-Cola Company at 14,
PepsiCo, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 680 (1978), rev'd sub nom. Coca-Cola Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Mack Deposition].
340 [Vol. 34:337
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cient use of refillable bottles requires a dense pattern of produc-
tion facilities. 4
Even though efficiencies of production and distribution using re-
fillable bottles demanded dense production facilities, the syrup
manufacturers lacked both the will 5 and the resources's to estab-
lish vertically integrated production and distribution systems.'
7
Thus was born the franchised bottler, who bought syrup from the
manufacturer and bottled the product for the local market pursu-
ant to an exclusive, perpetual appointment."
There are two reasons the use of refillable containers in a verti-
cally segregated organization required exclusive geographic mar-
keting territories. First, for the early bottlers the venture was quite
risky, as it would be for contemporary bottlers in an environment
of intense intrabrand competition, and territorial exclusivity was
the only way to attract participants.' 9 Second, the refillable bot-
14. See, e.g., Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act: Hearings on H.R. 3567 and H.R.
3573 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 61 (1979-1980) [hereinafter House Judiciary Hear-
ings] (testimony of Richard W. Caudill, Vice President, Central Investment Corp.).
15. As to the Coca-Cola system, management lacked faith in the idea of bottled soft
drinks. See THOMAS OLIVER, THE REAL CoKE-THE REAL STORY 14 (1986). In 1899, the ex-
clusive bottling rights for Coca-Cola in the whole of the United States, except New England,
Mississippi, and Texas, were sold for $1.00 to two lawyers. Id. At the contract signing Asa
Candler, the President of Coca-Cola, reportedly said: "If you boys fail in the undertaking,
don't come back to cry on my shoulder, because I have very little confidence in this bottling
business." WATTERS, supra note 10, at 57. In the case of Pepsi-Cola, the growth of the distri-
bution system took place in the 1930s, after Coca-Cola had long since proved the viability of
the bottling concept. Mack Deposition, supra note 13, at 14. Nevertheless, Pepsi-Cola chose
to franchise. Id.
16. See WATTERs, supra note 10, at 66; Mack Deposition, supra note 13, at 14.
17. There is also some evidence that the syrup manufacturers feared governmental scru-
tiny of an integrated production-and-distribution network. "[A Coca-Cola] archive source
speculates that [Coca-Cola owner and President from 1887 through 1915 Asa] Candler may
have had the vision to foresee that if a gigantic Coca-Cola controlled both ends of the mar-
ket, it might one day be a prime target of government trust busters." COKE'S FIRST 100
YEARS, supra note 11, at 50.
18. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 540-41 (1975) (initial decision), rev'd, 91 F.T.C. 517, 607
(1978) (final decision), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Mack Deposition, supra note
13, at 16-18, 29-30.
19. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 31 (testimony of Sidney P. Mudd, Chair-
man, National Soft Drink Association Special Franchise Committee).
The practice of licensing local bottlers to manufacture, distribute, and sell soft
drinks under a particular trademark in a defined territory began more than 75
years ago. The territorial exclusivity of the license agreement is critical to the
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tling process itself requires exclusivity. A bottler using refillable
bottles will always have a huge number of bottles in circulation,
either on the shelves of retailers or in the hands of customers.20
This supply of bottles out of the bottler's direct control is the
"float.' Refillable bottles cost more than the deposit that is
charged for their return, thus the bottler essentially finances the
float.22 If the bottler is not assured of recapturing this float, the
refillable operation cannot continue.23 Exclusive territories were
the only practical means of assuring that individual bottlers would
recapture their float. 4
For these reasons-the use of refillable bottles, the development
of a vertically segregated distribution system, the need to create
potentially higher rates of return in order to encourage investment
in bottling enterprises, and the need to protect each bottler's float
of refillable glass-the trademarked soft drink industry historically
has consisted of a large number of independent bottlers holding
appointments for a national brand in an exclusive geographic
territory.25
Courts have upheld the legality of the exclusive territories de-
spite early antitrust challenges.26 In 1967, however, the challenge
soft drink franchise system. Because of the substantial capital investment re-
quired to manufacture and distribute soft drinks, it was and is necessary to
grant the bottlers exclusivity in order to persuade them to make such
investments.
Id.
20. Id. at 52-53 (statement of Richard W. Caudill, Vice President, Central Investment
Corp.) (estimating four billion refillable soft drink bottles in circulation).
21. Id. at 52.
22. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 555-56 (initial decision).
23. "Returnable bottle usage would also decline because bottlers would be reluctant to
invest in returnable bottles when they had no assurance that they would be able to recap-
ture their large investment in returnable bottles for reuse." Id. at 559 (initial decision).
In assessing the impact of the order proposed by complaint counsel, it is perti-
nent in the context of respondents' bottler network that the use of refillable
bottles makes economic and competitive sense only if each bottler is able
steadily to recapture from the market an adequate, predictable supply of used
bottles to service his production requirements.
Id. at 648 (final decision).
24. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 48 (testimony of Richard W. Caudill).
25. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 532 (initial decision).
26. See, e.g., Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1946) (holding that
maintaining exclusive territories is not a Sherman Act violation); Coca-Cola Co. v. J.G.
Butler & Sons, 229 F. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916).
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to territorial exclusivity became more troublesome in the wake of
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 27 Following Schwinn, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) began an investigation of terri-
torial exclusivity in the soft drink industry and, in 1971, issued
complaints against PepsiCo, the Coca-Cola Company, and others,
seeking to have the exclusive territories declared illegal under sec-
tion five of the Federal Trade Commission Act.28 On the basis of a
voluminous record developed over the course of four years, the ad-
ministrative law judge determined that the territorial restrictions
were vertical in nature,29 which therefore distinguished the case
from Schwinn.30 The judge applied a "rule of reason" analysis3'
and found that the restrictions were reasonable.3 2 Despite the 1977
reversal of Schwinn, 3 in 1978 the FTC, by a vote of two to one,
overruled the administrative law judge,3 4 rejecting both the hori-
zontal35 and vertical 86 per se illegality analyses. Analyzing the situ-
ation under a rule-of-reason approach, 37 the Commission found
that the use of exclusive territories violated the law except insofar
as the territories were used with respect to refillable bottles.38
B. Passage of the Soft Drink Act
At the same time the soft drink industry appealed the FTC's
decision to the courts, it also lobbied Congress for legislation to
insulate the exclusive territories from antitrust attack. The lobby-
27. 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding that a manufacturer may not restrict or confine the re-
sale of its product after it parts with dominion over the product), overruled by Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
28. PepsiCo, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 680, 680 (1971) (complaint); Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 518
(1971) (complaint).
29. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 580 (initial decision).
30. Id. at 580-82 (initial decision).
31. Id. at 579-80, 582-85 (initial decision).
32. PepsiCo, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 680 (1975), rev'd sub nom. Coca-Cola Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 585-86 (initial decision).
33. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), overruling United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
34. Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 609-10 (final decision).
35. Id. at 611-14 (final decision).
36. Id. at 615 (final decision).
37. Id. at 616 (final decision).
38. Id. at 609 (final decision).
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ing effort was successful in 1980 with passage of the Soft Drink
Act, 9 which in turn resulted in dismissal of the FTC action.40
The Soft Drink Act passed both Houses of Congress by substan-
tial margins 41 and was signed into law by President Carter. 42 The
39. Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 96-308, 94 Stat. 939 (1980) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3503 (1988)). The Act provides:
SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Soft Drink Interbrand Competition
Act."
SEC. 2. Nothing contained in any antitrust law shall render unlawful the in-
clusion and enforcement in any trademark licensing contract or agreement,
pursuant to which the licensee engages in the manufacture (including manu-
facture by a sublicensee, agent, or subcontractor), distribution, and sale of a
trademarked soft drink product, of provisions granting the licensee the sole
and exclusive right to manufacture, distribute, and sell such product in a de-
fined geographic area or limiting the licensee, directly or indirectly, to the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of such product only for ultimate resale to
consumers within a defined geographic area: Provided, That such product is in
substantial and effective competition with other products of the same general
class in the relevant market or markets.
SEC. 3. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to legalize the enforcement of
provisions described in section 2 of this Act in trademark licensing contracts or
agreements described in that section by means of price fixing agreements, hori-
zontal restraints of trade, or group boycotts, if such agreements, restraints, or
boycotts would otherwise be unlawful.
SEC. 4. In the case of any proceeding instituted by the United States de-
scribed in subsection i of section 5 of the Clayton Act (relating to suspension of
the statute of limitations on the institution of proceedings by the United
States) (15 U.S.C. 16(i)) which is pending on the date of the enactment of this
Act, that subsection shall not apply with respect to any right of action referred
to in that subsection based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in
that proceeding consisting of the existence or enforcement of any provision
described in section 2 of this Act in any trademark licensing contract or agree-
ment described in that section.
SEC. 5. As used in this Act, the term "antitrust law" means the Sherman Act
(15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12 et seq.), and the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.)
Id.
40. Coca-Cola Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 642 F.2d 1387, 1390 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (re-
manding cases to the FTC for dismissal without prejudice). The court of appeals expressly
denied petitioners' request that a finding be entered declaring territorial exclusivity to be
lawful under the Soft Drink Act, basing its decision instead on the FTC's stipulation that its
action had been taken on the basis of legal standards other tharl those imposed by the Act.
Id.
41. The margins on final passage were 89 to 3 in the Senate, and 377 to 34 in the House of
Representatives. 126 CONG. REc. 11,359, 16,582-88, 17,713 (1980).
42. See Statement on Signing S.598 Into Law, 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1334 (July 10,
1980).
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initial question is how the Soft Drink Act passed over the opposi-
tion of the Justice Department,43 the National Association of At-
torneys General, 44 food-service trade groups, 45 and consumer
groups. 46 It is to this question that we now turn, using first a public
choice model and then a public interest approach.
C. The Public Choice Analysis of Passage
The [National Soft Drink Association is] . .. using economic,
translatable into political, muscle to buy a profit to which they
are not entitled by virtue of any investment of capital or labor
or creativity or enterprise or entrepreneurship that will be paid
for out of the pockets of the consumers.
So that in effect there can be really no reason to pass this bill
except for us to admit we've been bought off by the bottlers and
their lobbyists .... 47
The public choice model starts with the economic theory of leg-
islation, which "asserts that legislation is a good demanded and
supplied much as other goods, so that legislative protection flows
to those groups that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of
overall social welfare, whether 'welfare' is defined as wealth, utility,
or some other version of equity or justice. ' 4s Efficiency assump-
tions provide "that a group forms into an effective political coali-
43. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 13-17 (testimony of Richard J.
Favretto, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice)
(voicing the strong opposition of the Justice Department to the Soft Drink Act).
44. See NAAG Gives Preliminary Approval to Car Rental Enforcement Guidelines, 55
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1395, at 1001 (Dec. 15, 1988) (noting the National
Association of Attorneys General's opposition to the Soft Drink Act at the time of its
passage).
45. See Ken Rankin, On the Heels of Soda Industry, Others Take Antitrust Laws to
Task, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, June 20, 1983, at 6, 6 (recounting the opposition of food-
service trade groups to the Soft Drink Act at the time of its passage).
46. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 308-11 (prepared statement of Mark
Silbergeld, Director, Consumers Union, Washington Office) (stating that the Consumers
Union and Consumer Federation of America strongly opposed the Soft Drink Act).
47. Id. at 262 (testimony of Rep. Stark).
48. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Consti-
tution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 265 (1982) (explaining the "interest group theory" of legisla-
tion), quoted in part in Macey, supra note 2, at 474 (summarizing the "modern economic
theory of legislation").
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tion when the benefits from achieving wealth transfers from the
legislature outweigh the costs of organizing."49
Although public choice theory does not necessarily exclude the
possibility of motivations that are not narrowly economic,50 public
choice models either exclude such factors, 51 stretch the definition
of self-interest to make the proposition nonfalsifiable and tautolog-
ical,5 ' or turn the world on its head and make political participa-
49. Macey, supra note 2, at 475.
50. See Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 1, at 181 (noting that narrow self-interest is not
the sole motive, but is "a significant motive"); Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the
Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191 (1988) ("[I]ndividuals... are motivated primar-
ily by private interests rather than the public interest.").
51. See supra note 3. The public choice model is subject to attack for this simplification,
which can be seen as the product of mere analytical expedience. "We model man as a wealth
maximizer, not because this model is necessarily the most descriptive empirically, but be-
cause we seek a set of rules that will work well independently of the behavioral postulates
introduced." Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 1, at 188. Thus, Professor Kelman has at-
tacked the public choice model, arguing that "there is no reason to adopt the economists'
flattened motivational explanation, which has frequently been shown wanting, simply be-
cause it offers the most readily testable hypothesis." Kelman, supra note 3, at 220. Even the
analytical expedience argument for the one-dimensional model is wanting, because Profes-
sors Brennan and Buchanan devise their model not for "the descriptive exercise of provid-
ing predictions as to the likely outcomes of political interactions," but rather for "the nor-
mative exercise of investigating the incentive structures embodied in various institutional
forms." Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 1, at 180.
52. Just how narrowly to model the self-interest of political decisionmakers is a signifi-
cant problem for the public choice theorists. "The general public choice notion that public
leaders (whether elected or appointed) seek to maximize anything resembling a narrowly
specified wealth function is likewise hard to defend unless put in nonfalsifiable form (i.e.,
incorporating all ideological and desire-for-service variables within the selfish utility func-
tion)." Kelman, supra note 3, at 217-18. Some public choice theorists struggle mightily, but
not convincingly, with this problem:
Of course, any activity can be reconciled with private interest by inserting it
into the decisionmakers' utility function as a positively valued variable. The
obvious criticism of this reconciliation is that the theory that explains every-
thing explains nothing ....
This criticism notwithstanding, it is obvious that people place positive value
on a multitude of things, including participation and expression, and public
choice theory is not rendered less useful by acknowledging this fact. Public
choice assumes, as does economic theory in general, that, no matter what their
objectives, people pursue them rationally. They will allocate their limited re-
sources over alternative activities in order to maximize their personal satisfac-
tion. This assumption moves the analysis beyond the level of a meaningless
tautology that says nothing more than "people do those things that they want
to do."
Lee, supra note 50, at 193-94.
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tion a consumption item." Judge Mikva's commentary is particu-
larly helpful on this point: "The politicians and other people I
have known in public life just do not fit the 'rent-seeking' egoist
model that the public choice theorists offer." 54
Let us assume a public choice model on the terms most
favorable to its proponents, with political decisionmakers predomi-
nantly motivated by a desire to maximize their narrowly defined
self-interest, while admitting to the existence of ideological motiva-
tions.5 5 What types of results should such a system generate?
There are two dimensions to the answer: the first involves the sub-
stance of the legislation produced, and the second involves the pro-
cess by which such legislation is enacted.
As to substance, one would expect to find rent-seeking statutes,
legislation by which one group uses the power of government to
gain a transfer of wealth from another group. Public choice theo-
rists are careful to leave open the possibility that such rent-seeking
legislation can serve a legitimate end apart from the redistributive
calculus of the legislation's proponents.5 6 The public choice analy-
sis, however, sees the range of permissible transfers as extraordina-
This criticism of the public choice model retains a great deal of power, however, especially
if the goal of the model is the normative one of proposing constitutional changes, and not
merely the testable one of predicting behavior.
53. Lee, supra note 50, at 195.
The expectation of affecting the outcome has little to do with an individual's
motivation to vote.
... [P]eople receive satisfaction from participating in processes they feel
are important, from supporting things they believe are good, and from oppos-
ing things they believe are bad .... There is no more difficulty reconciling
voting with private interest than there is with reconciling attendance at sport-
ing events with private interest.
Id. at 193.
54. Abner J. Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REv. 167, 167 (1988).
55. But for the epithetical language, Professor Kelman presents the proper formulation:
The standard public choice models posit that politics can best be understood
as a market in which officials, seeking to maximize their own fortunes, "sell"
what is seen as the government's unique service, the capacity to steal from less
politically potent citizens, to voters motivated by the desire to steal. Obviously,
at base, such a claim is grounded in the idea that wealth-maximizing motives
best account for both voter and official behavior.
Kelman, supra note 3, at 205.
56. See Macey, supra note 2, at 508.
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rily limited.5 7 Basic public choice doctrine favors private transac-
tions over public transactions because the welfare implications of
the former are positive while the latter are indeterminate:
It is axiomatic that voluntary transactions in the private sector
provide all parties to such trades with a net welfare gain ...
The occurrence of such transactions also provides a net gain to
the public at large as entrepreneurs are forced by competitive
pressures to provide high-quality goods and services at low
prices.
By contrast, the welfare implications of transactions that oc-
cur because the legislature mandates them are indeterminate.
Some may provide net improvements in the social welfare;
others clearly do not. Often such transactions merely reflect the
triumph of raw political power over the disorganized public at
large.5 8
Therefore, because "it is extremely difficult to distinguish between
those governmental activities that involve 'amorally redistributive'
rent seeking. . . and those that represent wealth-increasing 'pub-
lic interest' governmental activities, 59 the public choice model es-
57. Professor Macey, for example, acknowledges that not all governmental activities
should be prohibited:
The most important normative implication [of the economic theory of legisla-
tion] is that the use of governmental regulation to achieve wealth transfers
imposes significant costs on society by impeding the process through which
market forces create wealth. Unfortunately, however, it is extremely difficult to
distinguish between those governmental activities that involve "amorally redis-
tributive" rent-seeking (and therefore should be prohibited) and those that re-
present wealth-increasing "public interest" governmental activities (and there-
fore should be encouraged).
Id. at 472-73. Lest the reader think Professor Macey is contemplating social welfare pro-
grams, however, it is instructive to note that the only examples of "wealth-increasing 'public
interest' governmental activities" provided by Professor Macey are
providing public goods (e.g. national defense); overcoming free-rider problems
that prevent private parties from reaching mutually advantageous agreements;
• ..and providing a responsible yet coercive enforcement mechanism for pri-
vately negotiated contracts .... In economic terms, the public interest func-
tions of government are to intervene in the market economy to correct market
failures or distributional shortcomings.
Id. at 472 n.8.
58. Id. at 515-16.
59. Id. at 472. Professor Macey has been greatly criticized for this aspect of his model.
For example, Professor Jack Beermann believes that "Macey's analysis often turns out to be
quite extreme, largely because Macey does not make an effort to distinguish desirable from
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sentially ignores the possibility of the latter and disfavors virtually
all rent-seeking legislation.
An expected result under the public choice model is that "the
legislature will produce too few laws that serve truly public ends,
and too many laws that serve private ends.160 Assuming away the
problem of rent-seeking statutes that advance the social welfare,
the redistributive function of rent-seeking is criticized both be-
cause of the immediate concern that rent-seeking legislation im-
poses costs on one group to the advantage of another 61 and because
of the longer term concern that such legislation diminishes compe-
tition62 and hobbles society's' ability to respond to changing eco-
nomic conditions. 63
The process dimension of the public choice model involves the
flow of value to the legislators who helped enact the statute.64
These values can be represented in money or votes and may be
cast in terms of the acknowledgment of leadership or ideological
fulfillment.65 In addition, the public choice model predicts some
conditions under which rent-seeking will be more likely to occur.
undesirable government action. This raises the suspicion that lurking behind Macey's theory
is a highly antiregulatory political agenda." Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics and
Judicial Behavior: Macey's Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 198 (1992). The
criticism is not limited to Professor Macey's work. Professor Kelman observes that "the
most significant evaluative term that reactionary legal economists apply in extolling the
private ordering that goes on against a backdrop of common law rules-that such activity is
'efficient' or 'wealth-maximizing'-is hopelessly ambiguous." Kelman, supra note 3, at 203.
The imprecision on the public-ordering side of the dichotomy is matched by what many
would consider a fundamental error on the private-ordering side. In structuring the dichot-
omy between public and private ordering, Professor Macey contrasts the net welfare effects
on "all parties to such trades" in private transactions with the "social welfare" implications
of public transactions. Macey, supra note 2, at 515-16. Such a construction effectively con-
cedes the larger point, that the social welfare implications of private transactions are
equally indeterminate.
60. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 277 (1988).
61. Professor Eskridge argues that the advantaged group often wastes the benefits, "leav-
ing society with a complete deadweight loss." Id. at 294-95.
62. The Soft Drink Act is of course an example of legislation that diminishes competition.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 3502 (1988) (altering antitrust treatment of soft drink trademark li-
censing agreements).
63. Macey, supra note 2, at 479 (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DW.1,INF OF NA-
TIONS: ECONoMIc GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SocIAL RIGIDITIES 74 (1982)).
64. See Eskridge, supra note 60, at 287-88.
65. See id. at 288.
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Among these are an asymmetry of costs and benefits,6 6 an ability
to control the free-rider problem,67 the availability of interest tie-
ins or preexisting groups upon which to build an organization, 8 a
position which is-or at least appears to be-efficiency creating,69
and a willingness to concentrate on the details of implementation
in lieu of the general thrust of the policy. 0
How does the public choice model fit the Soft Drink Act? As to
both the substantive and the process dimensions, it turns out that
the Soft Drink Act is a nearly perfect example of the type of legis-
lation a public choice model would predict.
In terms of substance, the Soft Drink Act is a classic form of
rent-seeking, subject to criticism on both immediate and long-
range economic grounds. As to the immediate term, one would ex-
pect to find costs imposed on one group to the advantage of the
proponents. In the case of the Soft Drink Act, the soft drink bot-
tlers, a small group, caused the legislature to pass a statute that
gives the proponents a concentrated benefit at the expense of soft
drink consumers, a much larger group."' In the long term, one
would expect to find that the rent-seeking statute diminishes com-
petition, perhaps by curtailing entry, and diminishes the society's
66. Professor Eskridge's typology, which discusses the four combinations of distributed
and concentrated costs and benefits, is interesting in this regard. He characterizes a statute
with concentrated benefits and distributed costs as "[c]lassic rent-seeking legislation." Id. at
290.
67. One possibility in meeting the free-rider problem is to seek legislation that is so nar-
rowly focused as not to be a public good in any real sense. Beermann, supra note 59, at 194-
95. A second possibility for reducing the free-rider problem is to work in a small group,
because "different groups display varying degrees of efficiency in exerting legislative influ-
ence. Relatively small groups and those otherwise able to control the free-riding behavior of
members can obtain legislation at a lower average cost than other groups." Macey, supra
note 2, at 494.
68. The ability to tie in an existing economic relationship with the projected group lobby-
ing is of obvious importance. Beermann, supra note 59, at 195-96; Robert D. Tollison, Pub-
lic Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 342 (1988) (discussing the "by-product theory
of group collective action").
69. The justification for this factor is that an efficiency-creating policy will be less likely
to create substantial opposition than an efficiency-reducing policy. Macey, supra note 2, at
476 n.16 (citing Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Politi-
cal Influence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371, 384-85 (1983)). Of course, in the real world, the perceptions
of other actors, not the underlying reality, control the strength of the opposition.
70. Lee, supra note 50, at 196.
71. See 15 U.S.C. § 3502 (1988) (altering antitrust treatment of soft drink trademark li-
censing agreements).
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ability to respond to changing economic conditions and to new
technology. In enacting the Soft Drink Act and allowing the soft
drink companies to enforce territorial restrictions, Congress con-
doned a restriction on intrabrand competition72 and erected a bar-
rier to the realization of scale economies from changing economic
conditions and new technologies.73
Some members of Congress recognized the Soft Drink Act for
what it was: "special interest legislation, pure and simple, and in
its worst form. '74 Indeed, during the floor debate in the House,
Representative Stark characterized the bill in terms that a public
choice academic might have chosen:
[W]e are faced here with a group of people, most [of] whom own
their businesses for the second or third generation, and all of
which are highly profitable. It would take a genius to run a bot-
tling company today with an exclusive territory and lose money.
Now they are asking for a perpetual built-in profit for the rest of
their lives and their family's lives.
The [National Soft Drink Association is] . . .using economic,
translatable into political, muscle to buy a profit to which they
are not entitled by virtue of any investment of capital or labor
or creativity or enterprise or entrepreneurship that will be paid
for out of the pockets of the consumers.
So that in effect there can be really no reason to pass this bill
except for us to admit we've been bought off by the bottlers and
their lobbyists, and there are 300 and some odd of my colleagues
who have testified to that by cosponsoring the bill which would
protect the exclusive territories.
72. By allowing the continuation of exclusive territories, see id., the Soft Drink Act per-
mits the elimination of intrabrand competition as to given products within each territory. Of
course the Soft Drink Act does not permit agreements limiting interbrand competition. See
id. ("Provided, That such product is in substantial and effective competition with other
products of the same general class in the relevant market or markets."). Thus, for example,
a Pepsi bottler would face no competition with regard to the bottler's Pepsi products within
the territory, although the Pepsi-Coke competition on essentially fungible products would
continue.
73. See infra note 83.
74. 126 CONG. REc. 16,571 (1980) (statement of Rep. Conyers); see also Ward Sinclair,
Soda Firms Push Bill to Take Fizz Out of Antitrust Laws, WASH. POST, June 18, 1980, at
A4 ("Under intense pressure from soda pop makers, Congress is about to grant the highly
profitable industry the most sweeping exemption from antitrust laws in 30 years.").
1993]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, being a political realist, and being able to
count beyond 20 with my shoes and socks on, it's likely that the
bottlers are going to win.75
Turning to the process dimension of the public choice model,
again the Soft Drink Act is a nearly perfect example of rent-seek-
ing in operation. Under the model, one would expect to find an
exchange between the proponents of the legislation and the legisla-
tors, in campaign contributions, the promise of votes, and the like.
Of course, the exchange can be a negative one; if the legislator does
not support the rent-seeking legislation, the proponent will sup-
port the legislator's opponent.
Once again, the Soft Drink Act fits the model. The Washington
Post described the "lobby effort that Congressional sources called
almost unprecedented for its audacious effervescence," and re-
ported that "[p]ressure became so heavy and the industry's clout
so imposing in recent weeks that several key legislators . . . re-
ported campaign threats and demands by the bottlers that no
amendments be accepted. 1 6 Senator Metzenbaum stated on the
Senate floor that the bill had "been subjected to one of the finest
lobbying efforts I have encountered since I have been in the Sen-
ate, and I find no fault about that."' " An "angry" Senator Metzen-
baum was less neutral off the floor, saying the "industry's highly
charged lobby campaign" was " 'just a sad commentary.' '7,8
Indeed, the soft drink industry's lobbying effort was so success-
ful that the bill had over seventy cosponsors in the Senate79 and
309 cosponsors in the House.80 The strong support in the Senate
allowed proponents easily to defeat a series of amendments offered
by Senator Metzenbaum, leading to the Senator's observation in
the floor debate that "the picture is clear now; it is unequivocally
clear. This bill is supposed to be for those little guys, those small
businessmen. The fact is that it is for the big boys. It is for the
75. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 262 (testimony of Rep. Stark).
76. Sinclair, supra note 74, at A4.
77. 126 CONG. REc. 10,968 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
78. Sinclair, supra note 74, at A4 (quoting Sen. Metzenbaum).
79. 126 CONG. REC. 10,946 (statement of Sen. Cochran).
80. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 12 (testimony of Rep. Hall) (reflecting
statistics as of the opening day of testimony).
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conglomerates, and it is for the syrup manufacturers." 81 With its
overwhelming support in the House, the soft drink industry was
able credibly to threaten House Judiciary Committee Chairman
Rodino with a discharge petition, which would have removed the
bill from Judiciary Committee consideration, causing the legisla-
tion to "move[] through the full committee with a few changes so
minor that the bottlers and their friends only smiled."82
The public choice model correctly predicts the situation in which
the soft drink industry proposed the Soft Drink Act. There was an
asymmetry between the benefits granted by the Soft Drink Act
and the costs imposed. Because of the narrow focus of the bill and
the small size of the proponent group, the free-rider problem was
minimal. In addition, the existing franchise network and bottler
associations facilitated organization of the proponents. The propo-
nents even made an efficiency argument,83 and they sought to co-
opt the potential opposition by associating their cause with two
others having broad political support- environmental protection 84
and small-business preservation.8 5 Finally, the proponents showed
a marked willingness to concentrate on the details of implementa-
tion in lieu of the general thrust of the policy with respect to at
least one of the larger policy issues with which they associated. 6
81. 126 CONG. REC. 11,341 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). Senator Metzenbaum was
addressing Amendment No. 1761, which would have made the Soft Drink Act applicable
only to "any licensee whose sales do not exceed $100,000,000 and whose assets do not exceed
$50,000,000," and which failed on a vote of 89 to 4. Id. at 11,340.
82. Sinclair, supra note 74, at A4. It was this heavy-handed move that prompted the
observation that "[tihe root beer express went sloshing through the House Judiciary Com-
mittee yesterday, assuring that the heavily lobbied exemption will soon reach the floor,
where passage is regarded as certain." Id.
83. Proponents made the claim, based primarily on anecdotal evidence, that small bot-
tlers were as efficient as large bottlers. See, e.g., House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14,
at 493-95 (written statement of Dwight C. Reed, National Soft Drink Association). The clear
weight of the academic analyses was that substantial economies of scale make the small
bottlers' operations less efficient. See, e.g., id. at 78-79 (written statement of Dr. Louis W.
Stern, Northwestern University). Subsequent academic analysis is in accord. See, e.g.,
ROBERT D. TOLLISON ET AL., COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION: THE ECONOMICS OF THE CAR-
BONATED SOFT DRINK INDUSTRY 107 (1991) (noting little debate on the fact that bottler con-
solidations have reduced production and other related costs).
84. See infra notes 139-62 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 163-215 and accompanying text.
86. The soft drink industry has shown a clear propensity to use the environmental card to
avoid regulation. See infra notes 98-99, 162.
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The public choice model fails with respect to the Soft Drink Act
in only one area. Professor Eskridge observes that the group push-
ing rent-seeking legislation "usually squanders virtually all of its
benefit on efforts to obtain the rent-seeking legislation, thus leav-
ing society with a complete deadweight loss. ''87 Although figures
are unavailable as to what the Soft Drink Act cost the soft drink
industry, and the value of territorial exclusivity cannot be esti-
mated with any reliability, it is certain that the Act gave the indus-
try a transfer of wealth from the consuming public that makes the
cost of the legislation pale to insignificance. At least it was not a
complete deadweight loss.
D. The Public Interest Analysis of Passage
Congress cannot responsibly grant the soft drink industry an an-
titrust exemption without a purpose. s8
Although the Soft Drink Act fits the public choice model, it is
also possible to explain passage of the Soft Drink Act by looking at
the public policy motivation of the public interest model. For our
purposes, I suggest a public interest model under which concern
for the public interest, however defined, 9 is a substantial but not
exclusive motivation for legislative behavior.90 Using such a defini-
tion, and notwithstanding the good fit of the Soft Drink Act and
the public choice model, a reasonable public interest rationale ex-
87. Eskridge, supra note 60, at 294.
88. 126 CONG. REC. 16,575 (1980) (statement of Rep. Jeffords).
89. One should exclude the purely egoistic conception of the public interest under which a
given legislator defines the nation's best interest exclusively in terms of his or her reelection
and maintenance.
90. Farber & Frickey, supra note 4, at 876 (identifying the "deliberative view" that "legis-
lators can operate somewhat autonomously"); Kelman, supra note 3, at 223 (declaring
groundless the claim of 16 public choice theorists that financial selfishness is the sole moti-
vating factor of those who seek public office). By allowing for "economic" considerations
within an essentially public interest model, this formulation roughly corresponds to Profes-
sors Farber and Frickey's "less grandiose version of the economic theory" and seems to be a
good fit with the political science scholarship they explore. Farber & Frickey, supra note 4,
at 900. This formulation is also compatible with Judge Mikva's conclusion that "[t]he basic
direction of political decisions is fashioned by people (whether voters or politicians) who are
thinking of the public interest (as they see it). A legislator who caters only to the rent-
seekers because he himself is only a rent-seeker will soon be an ex-legislator." Mikva, supra
note 54, at 173.
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ists for the legislation."' The soft drink industry advanced four ba-
sic reasons for the Soft Drink Act in the congressional debate:9 2
protection of the environment through the use of refillable bot-
tles,93 preservation of small business," maintenance of bottler in-
vestment,95 and clarification of the antitrust laws.96 Of the ratio-
91. Public choice theorists do not reject the possibility that a piece of rent-seeking legisla-
tion can have incidental public interest consequences, although they seem at a loss as to
how such combinations should be identified, much less handled. See supra notes 50-54 and
accompanying text.
92. Others characterized the reasons differently, but the former president of Coca-Cola
and a contemporaneous academic commentator included the small-business and refillable-
bottle rationales in their short lists. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 564 (writ-
ten statement of J. Lucian Smith, Director and former President, Coca-Cola Co.); Leonard
R. Stein, Note, The Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act of 1980: Antitrust Loses its
Fizz, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91, 124-32 (1981) (arguing that vertical restraints protect bot-
tlers' expectations, preserve small business, promote interbrand competition, and protect
the returnable bottle).
93. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 231 (testimony of Cartha DeLoach,
Vice President for Corporate Affairs, PepsiCo, Inc.); id. at 47 (testimony of Richard W.
Caudill, Vice President, Central Investment Corp.). Some industry spokespeople did at-
tempt to disassociate their support of the Soft Drink Act from the refillable container ques-
tion. See, e.g., id. at 473 (written statement of Charles B. Ruttenberg, Special Counsel for
the National Soft Drink Association).
94. See id. at 233 (testimony of Cartha DeLoach); id. at 34-35 (testimony of Sidney P.
Mudd, Chairman, National Soft Drink Association Special Franchise Committee); 126 CONG.
REC. 10,947 (1980) (statement of Sen. Cochran).
Industry representatives were somewhat disingenuous about the small business preserva-
tion rationale. "[Wlith the passage of [the Soft Drink Act]. .. the industry will continue to
have the local, unconcentrated structure which for so long has typified this national small
business industry." House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 37 (testimony of Sidney P.
Mudd). "This legislation was not 'designed to help small business'; neither do any propo-
nents of the legislation, known to me, 'insist that it is designed' to accomplish that." Id. at
468 (supplementary written statement of Sidney P. Mudd).
95. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 226 (testimony of J. Lucian Smith).
There is a sense of fairness, and I would not like that to go unnoticed. These
bottlers have invested huge amounts of money and time and effort in building
the equities they have in these businesses. If the Federal Trade Commission's
present order is allowed to stand, many, many, many bottlers will lose all of
that equity.
. . . [W]e don't know who will survive and who will demise, but many will
lose their equities without any chance of recovery, as we view it.
Id.
Soft drink bottlers require "extraordinary treatment" quite simply because the
effect on the soft drink industry from the FTC's decision, if that decision is
allowed to stand, would be extraordinary. . . . This attempt by the FTC to
restructure an entire industry overnight, thereby destroying 80 years of invest-
ment, justifies and indeed requires extraordinary treatment by the Congress.
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nales offered, I find only the first two to be valid on public interest
grounds."'
The proponents of the Soft Drink Act advanced the environmen-
tal-protection rationale in the House of Representatives 8 and the
Senate.9 9 Although they encountered opposition, 100 the proponents
won handily. 101 It is important to note that the environmental-pro-
tection rationale for the Act depends upon the use of refillable bot-
Id. at 521-22 (written statement of Cartha DeLoach).
96. See id. at 558 (written statement of J. Lucian Smith).
97. Of course, some of the small business preservation arguments advanced by industry
participants were simply classic "bad competition" arguments, often with no pretense of
social purpose; the kind of statements that public choice advocates hope for, but rarely find,
in public debates. See, e.g., id. at 46 (testimony of Charles L. Sandahl, Jr., President, Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co., Austin, Tex.) ("The FTC says there should be intra-brand competition to
bring down prices. Let me say, quite frankly, that I have all the competition I can stand,
and the prices we charge could not be lowered without going in the red.")
The protection of bottler investment is not a legitimate public policy goal for two reasons.
First, industry representatives made it sound as though bottler investment would be wiped
out immediately by an adverse ruling on the FTC litigation. E.g., id. at 226 (testimony of J.
Lucian Smith). However, hard investment in plant and equipment would have had substan-
tial residual value, and at least some bottlers had no substantial investment basis in the
franchise rights. Id. at 42-43 (testimony of Charles L. Sandahl, Jr.) ("[T]he [Pepsi]
franchise cost us nothing [in 1950]."). More important from the public policy perspective is
the argument that Congress has no business enhancing the value of a business that is depen-
dent on a history of operation now seen as illegal under the antitrust laws.
Clarification of antitrust law is a questionable justification for the Act, because a most
immediate and definitive clarification of the law would have come had the FTC litigation
been allowed to run its course. This very conclusion was reached by Chairman Rodino, id. at
1-2, the Justice Department, id. at 13, 16 (testimony of Richard J. Favretto, Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice), and Senator Metzen-
baum, 126 CONG. REc. 10,968 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). What was apparently really
at issue in the clarification argument was a feeling that the matter had taken too long and
that the expenditure of resources in pursuit of clarification was too great. See House Judici-
ary Hearings, supra note 14, at 282 (statement of Rep. Synar).
98. See, e.g., H.R. RE.P. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980) [hereinafter HousE. RE-
PORT No. 1118], reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2373, 2374.
99. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. 10,959 (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 10,947 (statement of
Sen. Cochran).
100. See, e.g., id. at 16,577 (statement of Rep. Pease); id. at 16,569 (statement of Rep.
Edwards) ("[T]he argument that the bill will save the returnable bottles does not stand
up."). Representative Rodino, who expressed skepticism as to the environmental rationale,
House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 247-48 (written statement of Rep. Rodino),
later supported passage of the Act on the basis of changes made with reference to the anti-
trust exemption point, not the environmental dimension. 126 CONG. REc. 16,568-69 (state-
ment of Rep. Rodino).
101. The margins on final passage were 89 to 3 in the Senate, and 377 to 34 in the House
of Representatives. 126 CONG. REc. 11,359, 16,582-83, 17,713.
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tles, because it is the dense production facilities and float
requirements associated with refillable bottle use that require the fa-
vorable antitrust treatment of exclusive territories. 102
Congressional supporters of the legislation also argued the small-
business rationale in both the House of Representatives103 and the
Senate.10 4 Although opponents of the legislation challenged the
small-business rationale in both the House 0 ' and the Senate,10
the proponents cast their arguments in terms of a'certainty, rather
than a mere possibility, that the small-business goal would be
achieved'0 7 and the proponents carried the vote handily. 08
The proponents framed the small-business rationale for the Act
in several ways. They argued, for example, that the demise of the
small, local bottlers would hurt directly the bottlers' employees
and the communities in which the operations were located. 0 9 They
102. See supra note 12-14 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 249-50 (testimony of Rep.
AuCoin); id. at 12 (testimony of Rep. Hall); 126 CONG. REC. 16,574 (statement of Rep.
Luken); id. at 16,572 (statement of Rep. Hammerschmidt); id. at 16,571-72 (statement of
Rep. Pickle).
104. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 11,355 (statement of Sen. Percy); id. at 10,947 (statement of
Sen. Cochran); id. at 10,922 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
105. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 279 (testimony of Rep. Weiss); 126
CONG. REC. 16,577 (statement of Rep. Pease).
106. 126 CONG. REC. 11,340-41 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum) (addressing Amendment
No. 1761, which would have made the Act applicable only to "any licensee whose sales do
not exceed $100,000,000 and whose assets do not exceed $50,000,000"). The amendment
failed on a vote of 89 to 4. Id. at 11,340-41.
107. The House of Representatives was told that "[the Soft Drink Act] will halt trends
that might otherwise lead to the demise of small bottling firms." HousE REPORT No. 1118,
supra note 98, at 3. Similarly, the Senate was told that "the Soft Drink Interbrand Compe-
tition Act will preserve a unique system of enterprise, which for the past 75 years has en-
couraged initiative, promoted competition, and established one of the most successful exam-
ples of small business development in this country." 126 CONG. REC. 11,334 (statement of
Sen. Hatch).
108. See supra note 101. The FTC had already rejected this economic argument in its
ruling, which served as the primary impetus for congressional action:
The Commission has also given careful consideration to the arguments of re-
spondents and the bottler intervenors advocating geographic market segmenta-
tion as a legitimate method of protecting "small" bottlers from intrabrand
competition. We have reviewed, in-depth, the evidence and the precedents
cited in support of this contention, and have concluded that this argument is
without merit.
Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 609-10 (1978) (final decision), reo'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
109. E.g., House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 12 (testimony of Rep. Hall).
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found a less direct harm from the rejection of territorial exclusiv-
ity, claiming that other small businesses in the community would
feel the demise of the local bottler; the claim was that distant bot-
tlers competing for business would focus on the more profitable
chain-store accounts, with the result that the small businesses in
the community either would not be served or would be disadvan-
taged as to price. 110 This concern is consistent with the record de-
veloped in the FTC proceeding. The administrative law judge
found that franchised bottlers, in their exclusive territories, would
service unprofitable accounts simply to increase market penetra-
tion."' If exclusive territories were eliminated, chain retailers
would receive competitive bids for warehouse delivery," 2 taking
high-margin accounts from the small bottlers and either forcing
them completely out of business'" or forcing them to cut back on
service or raise prices to lower margin accounts." 4
Was Congress motivated by the public interest when it passed
the Soft Drink Act? Some commentators argue that the question is
fallacious-that legislative bodies do not have an intent when they
act." '5 Others argue for a more pragmatic and flexible approach." 6
Although collective legislative intent is always to some extent inde-
110. Id. at 45 (testimony of Charles L. Sandahl, Jr., President, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.,
Austin, Tex.).
111. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 546 (1975) (initial decision), rev'd, 91 F.T.C. 517, 607
(1978) (final decision), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
112. There are two basic systems of product delivery in the soft drink industry: "store-
door delivery," in which the bottler delivers soft drink products to the individual stores, and
"warehouse delivery," in which the vendor delivers product to a centralized warehouse for
redelivery to the individual stores by the chain or independent broker's transport system.
Id. at 623-24 (final decision). "If territorial exclusivity were eliminated, the chain stores
would request bids for warehouse delivery from bottlers with the equipment and capacity to
service their needs, thus resulting in short-term wholesale price competition for warehouse
delivery business." Id. at 572 (initial decision).
113. Id. at 575-76 (initial decision).
114. Id. at 574 (initial decision) ("Bottlers of Coca-Cola charge the same price to all their
customers; but if bottlers lost chain store outlets which are the high volume and high profit
accounts to warehouse delivery, they would be obliged to cut back service to small accounts
or to raise prices, either of which would reduce volume.").
115. For example, Judge Easterbrook argued that a coherent collective legislative design
may be impossible to identify:
Because legislatures comprise many members, they do not have "intents" or
"designs," hidden yet discoverable. Each member may or may not have a de-
sign. The body as a whole, however, has only outcomes. . ..
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terminate, in some cases a collective intent certainly is ascertaina-
ble.'1 7 One factor in identifying collective legislative intent is the
statutory history available. Although some would greatly discount
such materials as committee reports,"1s it does appear that in some
cases, when the materials are undisputed and reflect a reasonable
picture of the legislative equilibrium, statutory materials provide a
reasonable indication of collective legislative intent."19
The Soft Drink Act presents a case that may support the argu-
ment that a legislative intent can be ascertained fairly. First, a rea-
sonable public interest justification for the legislation is identifi-
able in the statements of the participants. 20 Second, there is a fair
degree of unanimity in the statements of both the industry and
congressional participants. 121 Finally, the Act passed by wide mar-
gins in both the Senate and the House.122 The outlines of a bargain
between the soft drink industry and the public are ascertainable.
We are presented with two competing explanations for passage
of the Soft. Drink Act. Which is more plausible, the public choice
version of rent-seeking, or the public interest version of delibera-
tive government? Was the small-business argument the basis for
passage, thus supporting the public interest model; or was the eco-
... Although legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and pref-
erences, it turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these
lists into a coherent collective choice.,
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CM L. REV. 533, 547 (1983).
116. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 424 (1988).
117. As my colleague Professor Gwen Handelman reminds us in a slightly different con-
text, legislative intent is often identifiable if one approaches the exercise reasonably. "Often,
legislative intent will not be ascertainable but I posit that, realistically defined, legislative
intent is not a myth; and, more often than is generally acknowledged, sufficient probative
evidence is available for legislative intent to be reliably identified." Gwen T. Handelman,
Zen and the Art of Statutory Construction: A Tax Lawyer's Account of Enlightenment, 40
DEPAUL L. REV. 611, 615 (1991).
118. Compare Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 & n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding analytical error in using a committee report
to gauge the intent of legislators) with Farber & Frickey, supra note 116, at 425 (character-
izing as "excessive" Justice Scalia's "cynicism" on the judicial use of legislative history in
interpreting statutes).
119. Farber & Frickey, supra note 116, at 450.
120. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
121. Compare supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing industry arguments)
with supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text (discussing congressional arguments).
122. See supra note 101.
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nomic argument merely a cover for giving in to the powerful soft
drink lobby, as the public choice model would predict? On balance,
a careful reading of the record suggests to me that the public
choice model offers a better explanation, but I cannot prove the
conclusion. The only tangible proof is that although Congress em-
braced the rhetoric of the small-business rationale, it overwhelm-
ingly rejected the amendments offered by Senator Metzenbaum
that would have limited the benefits of the Soft Drink Act exclu-
sively to small business. 123 I reach the same conclusion with respect
to the environmental argument, supported in part by the over-
whelming rejection of the alternative offered by Representatives
Stark and Weiss, which would have mandated the use of refillable
bottles.2 On balance, then, the public choice explanation seems to
have greater resonance with the legislative result.
III. A DECADE OF CHANGE AND THE FUTURE
OF THE SOFT DRINK ACT
More than a decade has passed since the Soft Drink Act was
carried into law. It is instructive now to revisit the matter to see
what, if anything, should be done with the Act.
123. For example, Senator Metzenbaum's Amendment No. 1761, which would have made
the Act applicable only to "any licensee whose sales do not exceed $100,000,000 and whose
assets do not exceed $50,000,000," failed on a vote of 89 to 4. 126 CONG. REC. 11,340-41
(1980).
124. Representative AuCoin, who authored House Bill 2812, national deposit legislation,
properly framed the issue.
The choice facing this committee is by passing legislation that provides for
protection for the small bottler, you create then a possibility for the continua-
tion of the returnable bottle. That's a possibility. A possibility.
What we need to do is make it a likelihood and a certainty, and the certainty
comes by adding language, it seems to me, to the legislation that puts percent-
age targets and percentage requirements in the legislation, so that this isn't
just rhetoric used to justify an exemption from antitrust ....
House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 258 (testimony of Rep. AuCoin). Environmen-
tal proponents in the House attempted without success to gather support for bills that
would have required the use of refillable bottles in lieu of a sliding percentage of nonrefil-
lable containers. Id. Other environmental proponents attempted without success to pass a
complete ban on nonrefillable bottles. Id. at 262 (testimony of Rep. Stark).
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A. The Public Choice Mandate for Repeal or
Narrow Construction
The public choice legislative response to the Soft Drink Act is
the same now as it was in 1980. The Act, with its concentrated
benefits and distributed costs, barriers to entry, and burdens on
competition, is a shamelessly rent-seeking statute that Congress
ought to repeal. 25
Professor Eskridge suggests an appropriate public choice judicial
response. He argues that when dealing with statutes having con-
centrated benefits and distributed costs, the courts should
"[i]nterpret narrowly and refuse to provide special benefits unless
clearly required by statute."'26 In the case of the Soft Drink Act,
such a narrow reading would first address the question of whether
the Act confers blanket antitrust immunity on territorial exclusiv-
ity, and, if not, what standard of review the court should use.
The language of the Act is reasonably clear as to whether the
statute confers blanket antitrust immunity on agreements for ex-
clusive territories:
Nothing contained in any antitrust law shall render unlawful the
inclusion and enforcement ... of provisions granting the licen-
see the sole and exclusive right to manufacture, distribute, and
sell [trademarked soft drink] product in a defined geographic
area. . .Provided, That such product is in substantial and ef-
fective competition with other products of the same general
class in the relevant market or markets.127
This is not the language of an unqualified exemption; by its terms
the Act imposes a "substantial and effective competition" test. 2 8
However, and notwithstanding the plain language of the Act, some
courts applying the Soft Drink Act have acted as though it confers
125. It is theoretically possible, but extraordinarily unlikely, that one could identify social
welfare benefits of the Soft Drink Act sufficient to redeem it in the eyes of the public choice
analyst. This remote possibility is merged into the public interest discussion presented in
the following section.
126. Eskridge, supra note 60, at 299.
127. 15 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988) (emphasis added).
128. The contemporaneous academic discussions are in accord. See Anna B. Parker, Note,
The Soft Drink Act: Soft on Vertical Restraints?, 2 PACE L. REv. 249, 270-71 (1982); Stein,
supra note 92, at 137.
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unqualified immunity from the antitrust laws.1 29 These readings of
the statute are simply wrong.
If one concedes, as the plain language requires, that the Act im-
poses a substantial and effective competition test, the problem re-
mains how such a test should be interpreted and applied. One pos-
sibility is to treat the standard embodied in the Act as being the
same as a rule-of-reason analysis. The legislative history is rather
clear that Congress did not intend the Act to immunize territorial
exclusivity in the soft drink industry from review under the anti-
trust laws, and that Congress intended for courts to conduct that
review using a rule-of-reason standard. 30 Because the plain lan-
guage of the Act is not a mere restatement of the Sylvania rule-of-
reason, however, this reading is troublesome.
A second possibility is to treat the Act as a "positive restate-
ment" of the rule-of-reason test, arguing that "[a]lthough its ap-
proach is significantly different, the result of its application is the
same." 131 But the outcome of the application of the substantial and
effective competition test surely need not be the same as the out-
129. One court found that "[tihe legislative history of the Act confirms the purpose of
Section 3501 is to exempt from the antitrust laws agreements which essentially forbid trans-
shipping of soft drink products by resellers." O'Neill v. Coca-Cola Co., 669 F. Supp. 217, 225
(N.D. Ill. 1987). Another court held that "the Soft Drink Act was enacted to remove certain
soft drink industry practices from the reach of the antitrust laws." Pennsylvania ex rel.
Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 1988).
130. The committee has produced an amended bill that does not grant antitrust
immunity to the soft drink industry. Instead, it provides a restatement of ex-
isting antitrust law applicable to exclusive territorial franchises, as set forth in
the Supreme Court's 1977 GTE Sylvania decision. That decision, and this leg-
islation, insure that the rule of reason will apply to territorial restrictions im-
posed by a syrup manufacturer on his bottling franchises.
[I]t is the committee's intent that the rule of reason be applied fully and
fairly to authorize exclusive territories only when they operate consistently
with the competitive principles of our antitrust laws.
126 CONG. REC. 16,568-69 (1980) (statement of Rep. Rodino); see id. at 16,569 (statement of
Rep. Seiberling). The House Report was consistent with the interpretation that the legisla-
tion did not offer a complete exemption: "This legislation restates the rule of reason ap-
proach followed by the Supreme Court in Continental T.V. Inc. u. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977). The clarification eliminates uncertainty in the law that has plagued the in-
dustry, particularly small bottlers, during the last decade. It does not grant antitrust immu-
nities." HousE REPORT No. 1118, supra note 98, at 2 (citation omitted); see also id. at 2374-
76.
131. Parker, supra note 128, at 271.
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come of a rule-of-reason analysis. The rule-of-reason approach ar-
ticulated in Sylvania is based upon a review of "all of the circum-
stances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should
be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competi-
tion.'1 32 The substantial and effective competition qualification in
the Act is a less rigorous test than the rule-of-reason test under
Sylvania and its progeny.13 3 This analysis, however, is also
troublesome.
The best reading is to recognize the substantial and effective
competition test as different from the rule-of-reason analysis and
to recognize that the Act contemplates a two-step analysis: first, is
there substantial and effective competition, and second, if such
competition is not found, is the restraint legal under the rule-of-
reason test.3 Such a reading would be consistent with the public
choice directive to read rent-seeking statutes narrowly.
B. The Outstanding Public Interest Question
The public interest analysis of the Soft Drink Act after a dozen
years have passed is somewhat more complicated than the public
choice appraisal. A reasonable point of departure is to recognize
132. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49.
133. Compare Parker, supra note 128, at 269-70 ("[Tlerritorial exclusivity provisions...
are likely to survive the application of the Soft Drink Act standard.") with Louis W. Stern
et. al., An Application of a Rule of Reason Model to Coca-Cola's Use of Territorial Restric-
tions in Distribution, printed in House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 85 (arguing
that territorial exclusivity would not survive a rule-of-reason analysis).
134. See Stein, supra note 92, at 138 ("[R]ule of reason analysis will be applied only
where the court has already found that the relevant market is not competitive."). Another
author goes beyond the record, however, in claiming judicial approval of this approach. Dis-
cussing the remand order of the FTC decision in Coca-Cola Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981), that author asserts that:
[T]he Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set aside [the FTC] or-
ders, holding that they were "based upon legal standards which differ from
those in the ... Soft Drink Act." The court of appeals reasoned that, rather
than codifying the rule of reason standard, the Soft Drink Act introduced a
new standard into the analysis of vertical restraints.
Parker, supra note 128, at 253. This is a misreading of the court of appeals order. In fact,
the court noted that the parties agreed that the Soft Drink Act controlled, Coca-Cola, 642
F.2d at 1389, that the FTC stipulated that the standards used by the Commission varied
from those in the Act, id. at 1389, and found that the FTC's admission required the dismis-
sal, id. at 1390. The court made no independent finding that the Act failed to codify the
rule-of-reason standard.
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that this statute is not a public statute, with general application to
the populace, but is rather a private statute designed to confer
benefits on a narrow range of parties in return for widely dis-
persed public welfare gains. Because the Act, viewed under a pub-
lic interest analysis, is a bargain between the public and the pri-
vate recipients of benefits, it is appropriate to identify the
bargained-for public welfare gains and determine whether the pub-
lic has realized such results.
In the case of the Soft Drink Act, a considerable social cost cer-
tainly has been paid-the industry has realized substantial bene-
fits from passage of the Act and maintenance of territorial exclu-
sivity.135 The reciprocal social welfare gains were to have occurred
in the areas of environmental protection-through the increased
use of refillable containers-and small business preserva-
tion-through the continued operation of small, independent
bottlers. 13 6
The story of the soft drink industry in the 1980s is not a success
story in either the environmental or the small-business dimension.
The Soft Drink Act has failed to achieve either goal, and its fail-
ures have been dramatic. The use of refillable bottles has dropped
by about three-quarters since 1980,13' while, at the same time, the
dispersion of economic power within the soft drink industry into
smaller, more local units of production has been reversed
sharply. 38 The appropriate questions are: why were the public wel-
fare gains unrealized, and what effect should this failure have on
the future of the Soft Drink Act?
135. The administrative law judge in the FTC proceedings, for example, found that the
elimination of territorial exclusivity would, among other effects, substantially curtail or
eliminate effective merchandising by local bottlers, Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 573 (initial
decision), rev'd, 91 F.T.C. 517, 607 (final decision), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
limit service and raise prices to small accounts, id. at 574 (initial decision), eliminate some
brands and flavors, id. at 574 (initial decision), and put hundreds of bottlers out of business.
Id. at 574-75 (initial decision). In addition, the bottlers secured some relief from antitrust
claims based on prior claims. Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 96-308,
§4, 94 Stat. 939, 939 (1980).
136. See supra notes 93-94, 98-99, 103-04 and accompanying text.
137. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
364 [Vol. 34:337
SOFT DRINK INTERBRAND COMPETITION ACT
1. The Environmental Rationale
The environmental rationale for the Soft Drink Act rests on the
use of refillable bottles. Refillable bottles provide an environmen-
tally sound way to extend the life of soft drink containers, multi-
plying the use from a single container by a factor of up to twenty
before it is recycled for further use.139 There is also a case for refill-
able bottles based on consumer economics. Refillable glass bottles
historically have provided the consumer with soft drinks at the
lowest cost per ounce, in some cases less than half the cost of
nonrefillable containers. 140
With these advantages one might expect that refillable glass bot-
tles would dominate the soft drink market. The facts are exactly
the opposite. The use of refillable bottles was already in decline in
1980: refillable glass bottles had gone from a virtual 100% market
share in 1958 to 80% in 1966, 42% in 1976, and 38% in 1980.111
Against this history of decline, Congress was told in 1980 that
"[the Soft Drink Act] will halt trends that might otherwise lead to
the . . . disappearance of the refillable bottle.' 1 42 The trend away
from refillables continued after passage of the Soft Drink Act, and
today refillable glass bottles account for less than ten percent of
the market. 43 Nor is the future promising for refillables: "It's no
139. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 47 (testimony of Richard W.
Caudill, Vice President, Central Investment Corp.); Mack Deposition, supra note 13, at 25.
140. See Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 646-47 (1978) (final decision), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 555-57 (initial decision), rev'd, 91 F.T.C. 517,
607 (1978) (final decision), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981); House Judiciary Hearings,
supra note 14, at 542 (written statement of J. Lucian Smith, Director and former President,
Coca-Cola Co.); id. at 481-82 (written statement of Richard W. Caudill); Tracey Tyler, Pop
Firms to Start Anti-Cans Drive, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 16, 1990, at A8 (noting that refillables
are about 30% less expensive than cans).
141. See Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 557 (initial decision); House Judiciary Hearings, supra
note 14, at 252 (testimony of Rep. AuCoin) (citing National Soft Drink Association figures).
The National Soft Drink Association's figures for 1988 showed an overall mix of metal cans
(44%), nonreturnable glass (14%), returnable glass (10%), and plastic (32%), representing a
change from 1973 when the corresponding figures were metal cans (29%), nonreturnable
glass (17%), returnable glass (54%), and plastic (0%). Eric Bennour, Coke Decides Return-
able Bottles Not the Real Thing, Bus. FiRST-LouIsviLLE, May 28, 1990, § 1, at 9, 9.
142. HOUSE REPORT No. 1118, supra note 98, at 3.
143. Benmour, supra note 141, § 1, at 9; Two New Contour-Pak Sizes Now Available,
BEVERAGE WORLD, Mar. 1989, at 1, 1 (reporting that 1988 sales of refillable soft drinks were
less than seven percent) [hereinafter Two New Sizes].
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secret that refillable soft drink sales are going downhill," observed
one trade publication, "[f]ast.' 144
Why have refillable glass bottles suffered such a great decline?
Should we rethink the Soft Drink Act linkage between refillable
bottles and environmental protection? Industry representatives
often point to consumer choice to explain the decline of the refill-
able bottle-an increased emphasis on "convenience and active
lifestyles" is to blame. 45 To these industry spokespeople, the cus-
tomer in the market is sovereign, and if refillables do not sell, the
industry should not market them. 46
It is a nice story, especially to those who believe in the myth of
the omniscient invisible hand of the free market, but the reality is
somewhat different. The easiest explanation for the decline of re-
fillable bottles is that they simply have not been available in many
major markets.147 There is substantial evidence that some bottlers
and retailers refuse to produce or stock refillable bottles. For ex-
ample, a senator has cited one government study for the proposi-
tion that "much of the pressure to switch from returnable to non-
returnable containers comes from the intermediate customers'
stores and distributors, rather than the ultimate consumer .. .
[and] that the consumer may have had little effect on the choice of
container type. ' 14s Another manifestation of the hostility of some
bottlers and chain stores is the disparate treatment of refillable
144. Two New Sizes, supra note 143, at 1.
145. See R. Blair Murphy, Aluminum Containers in the Beverage Industry, in Effective
Beverage Marketing Through Better Packaging, 118 AM. MGMT. ASS'N MGMT. BULL. 11, 12
(1968) (citing "the affluent consumer's desire for convenience") [hereinafter Effective Bever-
age Marketing]; Two New Sizes, supra note 143, at 1.
146. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 243-44 (testimony of Cartha
DeLoach, Vice President for Corporate Affairs, PepsiCo, Inc.).
147. Id. at 247-48 (written statement of Rep. Rodino) ("In major metropolitan areas such
as New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, the refillable bottle has almost totally disappeared.
Pepsi-Cola has provided us with information that 34 of its franchised bottlers produce no or
insignificant numbers of, soft drinks in refillable bottles.").
148. Id. at 388 (written submission of Sen. Hatfield) (citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF A NATIONAL MANDATORY DEPOSIT ON BEVERAGE CONTAINERS). There is
ample evidence in the record that chain stores have discouraged bottlers from producing
and stocking refillable glass bottles. Id. at 53 (written statement of Richard W. Caudill, Vice
President, Central Investment Corp.). The phenomenon is not new. See, e.g., Milton E.
Bergwall, Innovations in Carbonated Beverage Packaging, in Effective Beverage Market-
ing, supra note 145, at 6-7 (describing the history of 1960s retail chain efforts to replace
returnables with nonreturnable glass bottles).
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and nonrefillable containers in advertising. As the old retail trade
adage goes, "We promote what we sell and we sell what we
promote.' 114 9
Why the hostility to refillable bottles among some retailers and
bottlers? From the retailers' standpoint, there are three primary
reasons. First, there is a perception that the logistical requirements
of bottle redemption, sorting, and storage place a substantial bur-
den on the retailer who sells refillable bottles.150 Second, because
the use of refillable bottles requires a means of getting the used
bottles back to the vendor, as a practical matter such a system re-
quires a store-door delivery system rather than a warehouse deliv-
ery system.151 Chain retailers would prefer a unified warehouse de-
livery system even to the point of sacrificing the traditionally
higher profits on refillable bottles.152 Third, national brands in re-
fillable bottles are price competitive with the retailers' private la-
bel soft drinks, and the retail chains want to limit the competition
for the price-sensitive segment of the consumer market. 53
149. Bruce Oman, A Clear Choice?, BEVERAGE WORLD, June 1990, at 78, 78. Of course,
some bottlers promote refillable use through pricing and advertising. "The price of a canned
Coke has been hiked five cents a can in Georgia by the Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. in a
campaign to encourage consumers to purchase Coke in returnable bottles." Price Increases,
WASHYPOST, Jan. 4, 1979, at D10.
150. See Mack Deposition, supra note 13, at 25; Nicholas J. D'Agostino, Jr., A Retailer's
View of Merchandising in the Beverage Industry, in Effective Beverage Marketing, supra
note 145, at 21, 22-23 (identifying retailers' handling costs from refillable containers).
151. There is general agreement that warehouse delivery and refillable bottles are not
compatible. See Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 543 (1975) (initial decision), rev'd, 91 F.T.C.
517, 607 (1978) (final decision), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981); House Judiciary
Hearings, supra note 14, at 234 (testimony of Cartha DeLoach, Vice President for Corpo-
rate Affairs, PepsiCo, Inc.); id. at 45 (testimony of Charles L. Sandahl, Jr., President, Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co., Austin, Tex.); id. at 559-60 (written statement of J. Lucian Smith, Direc-
tor and former President, Coca-Cola Co.).
The tension between refillables and warehouse delivery is not new. Pepsi-Cola first experi-
mented with steel cans prior to 1951 but discontinued the experiment because of the trans-
shipment problems that warehouse delivery caused. See Mack Deposition, supra note 13, at
24-28.
152. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 542 (written statement of J. Lucian
Smith) ("[Flood chains, as a matter of policy, take a higher profit on Coca-Cola in return-
ables than on Coca-Cola sold in disposable packages [and] often refuse to price-promote
returnables even when wholesale price promotions are offered by the bottler."); see also id.
at 53 (written statement of Richard W. Caudill).
153. See Coca-Cola, 91 F.T.C. at 558 (initial decision).
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The antipathy of some bottlers toward refillable bottles arises
because the efficiencies of transportation and return of the used
bottles require a much smaller territory for a refillable bottle oper-
ation than for a nonrefillable-based operation. 54 Some bottlers
have moved from refillable bottles to cans and nonrefillable bottles
in order to replace the dense production organization demanded
for refillable bottles with fewer, larger, centralized production facil-
ities and satellite warehouses, leaving no local production facilities
to serve local markets. 155 The antipathy of such bottlers toward
refillables is predictable.
One might be tempted to enforce the bargain struck in 1980 and
require the use of refillable glass bottles. Certainly nothing in the
sales history of refillable bottles, or the history of antipathy on the
part of some retailers and bottlers, would either call into question
the 1980 congressional judgment in support of refillables or justify
the abandonment of this environmentally prudent alternative in
the future. It is true that revolutionary changes in packaging have
occurred with regularity in the industry ever since the introduction
of alternatives to refillable bottles over thirty years ago. 115 The
problem, discussed in the following section, is that since the pas-
sage of the Soft Drink Act in 1980, the soft drink industry has gone
through a wave of facility consolidations, 57 a fundamental shift in
organization that makes a return to the refillable glass bottle much
more than a mere change in packaging. The industry may have
changed in such a basic way that Congress no longer can enforce
the agreement embodied in the Soft Drink Act.
The soft drink industry might argue that, notwithstanding the
demise of the refillable soft drink container, it has met the under-
lying environmental goal of the Soft Drink Act. Certainly the soft
drink industry is working to make itself appear environmentally
154. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 61 (testimony of Richard W.
Caudill).
155. See id. at 60 (testimony of Peter Chokola, President, Chokola Beverage Company,
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.).
156. See CoKE'S FIRST 100 YEARS, supra note 11, at 50-52; id. at 124-35 (presenting a
history of Coca-Cola packaging). One of the few packaging miscues led to Coke's withdrawal
of the LOPAC plastic bottle in 1974, following a Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
question as to carcinogens. See id. at 135.
157. See infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
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responsible, 158 and there are signs of environmental progress. For
example, both Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola announced that by the
end of 1991 they would have only packaging types that can be
158. The industry efforts include a predictable amount of empty posturing: "Think this
industry isn't environmentally aware? Think again.. .. [T]he beverage world has Planet
Earth on its mind." Greg Prince, Again and Again, BEVERAGE WORLD, Dec. 1990, at 62, 62.
There is also some progress mixed in with the hype. For example, in the fourth quarter of
1990, amid great fanfare, both Pepsi and Coca-Cola announced the development of new
technology to make polyethylene terephthalate (PET) plastic recyclable into soft drink bot-
tles. Coca Cola, Pepsi Plan to Introduce Bottles Using Recycled Plastic, INTEGRATED WASTE
MGMT., Dec. 12, 1990, at 3, 3 [hereinafter Recycled Plastic]. The announcement was greeted
with skepticism. Plastics recycling industry insiders assessed the venture as "a public rela-
tions stunt that would prove too costly to pursue," Barnaby J. Feder, Profits, and Problems,
for Recycler, N.Y. Tlms, Jan. 8, 1991, at D1 (quoting Thomas M. Duff, President, Wellman,
Inc.), and predicted that "the program will probably not grow beyond a demonstration pro-
ject." John Holusha, Coming Clean on Goods: Ecology Claims Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 1991, at D1. The skeptics, however, were wrong. The FDA has approved the use of re-
cycled PET plastic for food-contact use, and the marketing of such containers is now under-
way. See, e.g., Label from a two-liter bottle of Diet Coke, purchased Mar. 19, 1992, Lexing-
ton, Va. (on file with the author, awaiting recycling) ("Bottle made with at least 25%
recycled plastic").
The soft drink industry, however, seems constitutionally unable to be straightforward on
these issues; both Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola have announced that they will not pass on to
their customers the increased cost of the recycling program. The position of the Coca-Cola
Company is firm, but inexplicably so: " 'Of course, these costs won't be passed on to the
consumer. . . .' "Recycled Plastic, supra, at 3. Pepsi-Cola's position is equally obtuse: " 'It
is not a question of economics; it's a question of doing the right thing .... Consumers
want environmentally correct packages. . . . Besides, it's our nickel. . . . We are not going
to pass on the added cost."' Holusha, supra, at D1 (quoting Andrew Giangola, Pepsi-Cola
spokesperson).
Apparently, "doing the right thing" in environmental terms is not always the policy. The
soft drink industry has been reluctant to implement in this country environmentally desira-
ble practices that it has adopted in foreign markets. For example, the technology has been
developed to make PET plastic bottles refillable, not merely recyclable; both PepsiCo and
the Coca-Cola Company have test-marketed refillable PET plastic bottles in Europe. Alan
Wolf, Drinktec-Interbrau: Living the Dream, BEVERAGE WORLD, Dec. 1989, at 66, 70
(describing refillable PET bottles being tested by the Coca-Cola Company in West Germany
and by PepsiCo in the Netherlands). Refillable PET plastic bottles were developed under
pressure from European environmental authorities and only after nonrefillable PET plastic
bottles were forced from the German market. See Sean Milmo, European Plastics on a
Downward Track: Plastics '90 Special Report, CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., Feb. 12, 1990, at
SR19, SR19.
The refillable PET plastic bottles are reported to have a 20-round-trip life cy-
cle-equivalent to that of a glass refillable. Wolf, supra, at 70. There are at present no plans
to introduce the refillable PET plastic bottle into the domestic market. Interview with Coca-
Cola Company spokesperson, who spoke on condition that she not be identified by name, in
Atlanta, Ga. (July 10, 1991); Telephone Interview with Andrew Giangola, Pepsi-Cola spokes-
person (July 11, 1991).
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made with recycled materials. 159 The soft drink industry is also a
forceful advocate of comprehensive curbside recycling programs, in
which municipalities use their refuse removal systems to collect
and recycle a broad array of household materials. 1 0
Ultimately, however, a substituted-performance argument would
be a mere artifice, because whether one accepts or rejects such an
argument is irrelevant to the future of the Soft Drink Act."6' The
simple fact is that such laudatory programs as the production and
recycling of nonrefillable soft drink containers does not depend on
the existence of exclusive distribution territories. The refillable
bottle required territorial exclusivity; as the soft drink industry
abandoned the refillable bottle, it also abandoned the justification
for the Soft Drink Act. Although the soft drink industry perhaps
159. Recycled Plastic, supra note 158, at 3.
160. Pepsi-Cola Announces Environmental Breakthrough: Recycled Plastic PET Bottle,
PR NEWSWIRE, Dec. 4, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File (quoting
Paul Griswold, Director of Packaging Development and Procurement, Pepsi-Cola Com-
pany). "Pepsi-Cola strongly endorses and supports curbside recycling efforts, as the pre-
ferred method to recover the materials in soft drink containers.. .. 'Pepsi will continue to
support a comprehensive program to manage solid waste.' " Id.
161. There is ample justification for caution in accepting the substituted-performance ar-
gument. An administrative law judge in an FTC case conducted a comprehensive evaluation
of the relative environmental costs of aluminum cans, steel cans, nonrefillable glass bottles,
and refillable glass bottles, concluding that in realistic situations, the refillable glass bottle is
the best container from an environmental standpoint:
From the standpoint of raw materials consumed in the manufacture of soft
drink containers; the energy used in the processing of raw materials, the manu-
facture of containers, the filling of containers, and the transportation associ-
ated therewith; water use; solid waste generation; air pollutants; water-borne
wastes; and energy effluents, the returnable bottle is the preferred soft drink
container even at trippage rates below ten. At approximately four trips, the
returnable bottle has the same composite impact on the environment as the
conventional steel can. A returnable bottle with trippage as low as two still has
roughly the same impact as a non-returnable bottle. A returnable bottle with a
trippage between four and five has the same composite environmental impact
as does an aluminum can which is recycled at an 80 percent rate.
Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 571-72 (1975) (initial decision) (citations omitted), rev'd, 91
F.T.C. 517, 607 (1978) (final decision), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The matter
needs to be reexamined in light of substantially changed circumstances since the 1975 com-
parison. Movement to a substantially less dense production infrastructure has worsened the
environmental performance of refillables by increasing the distances over which such con-
tainers must be delivered and returned. The significant advances in recycling technology
and community recycling efforts since 1975 need to be taken into account.
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should be applauded for its environmental commitment, 1 2 the in-
dustry does not merit unnecessary special antitrust treatment
under the Soft Drink Act.
2. The Small-Business Rationale
The small-business rationale for the Act was that it would pro-
tect the network of independent, local bottlers. On this dimension,
as on the environmental dimension, the dozen years since the pas-
sage of the Soft Drink Act have been a period of failure, not
success.
The concentration of economic power within the soft drink in-
dustry had begun well before 1980. In 1900, after an initial decade
of phenomenal growth, there were approximately 2,700 soft drink
162. Substantial, albeit anecdotal, evidence indicates that the soft drink industry sup-
ports some recycling programs primarily as a means of deflecting more intrusive environ-
mental requirements. For example, some within the industry view curbside recycling as a
means of deflecting government scrutiny from the soft drink industry:
There is only one proven way to avoid container deposit, redemption and pack-
aging laws. The litter tax concept doesn't fly. Industry promises "to do a better
job in recycling" aren't enough. The only option is to propose a comprehensive,
multimaterial recycling program statewide or provincewide. This tactic com-
monly involves industry support of a comprehensive recycling law.
Jerry Powell, The Soft Drink Industry Gets Relief in Ontario, BEVERAGE WORLD, May 1990,
at 90, 90. One industry advocate has advised that "the industry must position itself as a
facilitator of comprehensive solid waste solutions if it is to avoid the stroke of the legisla-
tor's pen." Andrew Galvin, Solid Waste Challenge, BEVERAGE WORLD, June 1989, at 23, 23.
In his view, curbside recycling is "the most potent weapon beverage packaging has to up-
grade its image with legislators." Id. This is not to dismiss curbside recycling programs, for
despite the self-serving advocacy of the soft drink industry, there is logic to the use of inte-
grated recycling programs.
The bottom line is that post-consumer beverage containers are good for the
bottom line. As more communities turn to curbside separation and recycling to
cut down on the amount of trash headed for the landfill or the incinerator, it is
in everybody's best interest to include beverage packaging in the plan. The
resale value of these materials helps pay for the cost of collection, the house-
holder can take care of all his recycling at curbside, and retailers, bottlers and
wholesalers don't have to handle returned empties.
Id.
The critical point for this discussion is the last, that with curbside recycling the empty
bottles are not returned through the store to the bottler. Because the empties are not re-
turned to the bottler, the justification for exclusive territories-to preserve each bottler's
float-disappears.
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bottlers in the United States."'3 The high point in terms of the
number of bottlers occurred in the 1950s, when there were some
6,000 bottlers in the United States.164 From this high, the pool of
bottlers has eroded, mostly at the expense of the small non-
franchised independents.16  By 1970, the number of bottlers was
back to early twentieth-century levels of approximately 3,000.6
By 1980, only one decade later, the number was down to 1,900 bot-
tlers. 67 The trend toward concentration of the units of production
continued after passage of the Soft Drink Act; in 1988 there were
fewer than 1,100 bottlers,6 8 and the end of the implosion is not in
sight.169
The concentration goes beyond the elimination of local facilities;
ownership patterns are also changing. Large conglomerates have
bought into the bottling community, eroding the local, small-busi-
ness character of the industry. 70 More significantly, both Coca-
163. See TCHUDI, supra note 11, at 21-52, 57. Consumption patterns were much different
at the turn of the century as well; in 1900 the per-capita consumption of soft drinks was 12
bottles or glasses per year. Id. at 57.
164. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 224 (statement of Rep. Rodino) (quot-
ing National Soft Drink Association figures).
165. Id. (statement of J. Lucian Smith, Director and former President, Coca-Cola Co.).
166. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 224 (statement of Rep. Rodino) (quot-
ing National Soft Drink Association figures); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMM.,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 778 (110th ed. 1990) [hereinafter CENSUS].
167. CENSUS, supra note 166, at 778.
168. Id.
169. "Production-scale economies have motivated a substantial consolidation of U.S. soft
drink production facilities. Roughly 6,600 plants were in production in 1950; only about
1,000 are producing today. Despite this drop, there may yet be substantial economies to be
reached by further consolidations." TOLLISON ET AL., supra note 83, at 77; see also House
Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 279 (written statement of Rep. Weiss) (stating that
the market concentration trend is irreversible); id. at 77-78 (written statement of Dr. Louis
W. Stern, Northwestern University) (asserting that natural market forces compel industry
concentration); id. at 224 (statement of Rep. Rodino) (quoting National Soft Drink Associa-
tion figures).
170. [M]any larger corporations, Fortune 500 companies, such as Beatrice Foods,
IC Industries, General Cinema and Warner Communication-all of these are
major soft drink bottlers.
The Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York, a so-called independent bottling
company, ranks in the Fortune 500 and owns bottling companies in Maine,
Kentucky, Kansas, Nebraska, and Colorado, as well as in New York.
The Coca-Cola Co. and Pepsico, Inc. are themselves among the Nation's
largest bottlers.
126 CONG. REc. 10,968-69 (1980) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
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Cola and Pepsi-Cola have integrated forward to bring formerly in-
dependent bottling operations under the control of the parent
companies. 17 1 Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola now have an equity inter-
est in bottlers accounting for two-thirds of their respective na-
tional markets.7 2
This integration represents a dramatic change in policy; s73 in-
deed, the legislative history of the Soft Drink Act can be read
fairly to contain representations by both parent companies that
such consolidations were not contemplated. "We owned a few bot-
tling plants for a long number of years," testified the former presi-
dent of the Coca-Cola Company, J. Lucian Smith.17 4 "We pur-
chased the Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co.," he continued, with
reference to. the firm's sole recent acquisition, "which is our
hometown, because it was put on the market by the owners, not
because we sought it, and we felt it had many advantages that we
should own a plant in our hometown."'' 7 This representative of the
Coca-Cola Company characterized his company's ownership as "de
minimis" and, when pressed, represented that "[t]here has not
been a policy change at all. . . . Policywise, we have not changed
our policy. . . . Our policy is not to own."1' 7 Asked again about
the parent company buying up local bottlers, Smith responded as
follows:
Mr. Volkmer. [W]ould you as Coca-Cola come in and buy up
bottlers?
Mr. Smith. Oh, no, sir.
Mr. Volkmer. You wouldn't do that?
Mr. Smith. Well, I mean if you calculate it, I've already said
that the bottlers have $2 billion invested. I can't imagine that
171. See OLIVER, supra note 15, at 191 (discussing the integration at Coca-Cola).
172. TOLLISON Er AL., supra note 83, at 113 n.10. ("Coca-Cola, through Coca-Cola Enter-
prises and other equity interests, reportedly has an equity interest in bottlers that represent
70 percent of its U.S. volume. PepsiCo reportedly has an equity interest in bottles [sic]
representing 65 percent of its U.S. volume.").
173. OLIVER, supra note 15, at 191 ("Coca-Cola reversed a century-old policy of fostering
an almost totally independent bottling system."); TOLLISON ET AL., supra note 83, at 1.
174. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 220 (testimony of J. Lucian Smith,
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we'd undertake to do that. We don't believe in it, in the first
place.17
7
This testimony was consistent with the findings of the adminis-
trative law judge in the 1975 FTC case, 7" who found that the
Coca-Cola Company had a policy of limiting the number of bot-
tling operations it owned 17 and selling off its regional canning op-
erations as the bottling community was ready to invest. 80
Coca-Cola apparently started planning the forward integration
of the bottling network before the ink on the Soft Drink Act was
dry.'8 ' The integration through direct purchases and equity invest-
177. Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
178. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1975) (initial decision), rev'd, 91 F.T.C. 517, 607 (1978)
(final decision), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
179. Id. at 527-28 (initial decision). Noting that in 1971, the Coca-Cola Company oper-
ated 27 bottling plants serving 14% of the population, Judge Joseph P. DuFresne stated:
Most of the subsidiary bottling plants were acquired years ago to assure the
availability of Coca-Cola in territories when bottlers in those territories had to
sell out or did not have the financial resources and independent firms with
money and know-how were unavailable in those areas. The policy of the com-
pany for over a decade has been that such a subsidiary bottler is to be sold
when the company acquires one so that the number of subsidiaries remains
stable.
Id. at 528 (initial decision).
180. Judge DuFresne noted that a Coca-Cola subsidiary had "constructed canning plants
... in areas where there was inadequate canning capacity," but that as "independent bot-
tlers in some areas desire to invest in them, the company has sold canning plants." Id.
181. In a 1986 interview, Coca-Cola USA President Brian Dyson addressed the ownership
question and indicated that the planning for the forward integration started as early as
1981.
I'd say [the purchase of JTL, the largest bottler in the world, by the Coca-Cola
Company is] a natural evolution of the [bottler] system. We started this whole
campaign back in 1981, and, in effect, it was setting up a system that some day
would deal with situations such as a major Coca-Cola bottler, who for reasons
that were sovereign and personal to that group of shareholders, decided that
they wanted to restructure their ownership. . . . We applaud those critical
members of our system, big, large or medium-sized, who, when they have a
reason to change their ownership structure, do it in a way that is strengthening
to the system and not just unilateral. And that is why I think that is such a
fantastic example of all we have been working on over these five or six years. I
would say it's probably one of the most outstanding, strategic thrusts that we
have had, historically.
Coke's First 100 Years, supra note 11, at 218-19. At the same time Don Keough, President
of the Coca-Cola Company, said, "We think we've got a potful of opportunities in the soft
drink business to make sensible investments [in the 1980s]." Id. at 200.
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ments 82 proceeded apace through the 1980s.'83 In a two-week pe-
riod in 1986, Coca-Cola invested $2.4 billion in bottling opera-
tions."" By the end of the decade, the Coca-Cola Company,
through its subsidiary Coca-Cola USA, and then through Coca-
Cola USA's forty-nine percent-owned subsidiary Coca-Cola Enter-
prises, had basically tripled its hold on the market and controlled
bottlers serving forty-three percent of the nation.l85 A 1991 study
stated that seventy percent of the market is served by bottlers in
which Coca-Cola has an equity interest. 88 Coca-Cola does now ad-
mit the obvious, that the forward integration has changed the
ground rules of the industry: "[Coca-Cola Enterprises] is an 800-
pound gorilla as far as the system is concerned, and since they are
our next door neighbors, we have more regular contact. In many
ways it is a very close operating arrangement.'
i8 7
Pepsi-Cola followed a parallel integration path. 88 At the time of
the hearings on the Soft Drink Act, Pepsi-Cola controlled five per-
182. Not all of the forward integration has been achieved through majority ownership, or
even ownership through the Coca-Cola Enterprises vehicle. In 1986, Roberto Goizueta,
Chairman of the Coca-Cola Company, indicated interest in the acquisition of minority, inter-
ests and the structuring of joint ventures as part of "our restructuring efforts." Id. at 200-02.
183. Coca-Cola (either Coca-Cola USA or Coca-Cola Enterprises) acquired the following
bottlers since passage of the Soft Drink Act: Associated Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (June 1982),
Mid-Atlantic Bottling Co. (Aug. 1984), Wometco Bottling Co. (Oct. 1984), Louisiana Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., Ltd. (Dec. 1984), Central States Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (Mar. 1985), Ath-
ens Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (Oct. 1985), Beatrice Company's Coca-Cola Bottling Operations
(June 1986), JTL Corp. (July 1986), Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York (Nov. 1986), Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of South Florida, Inc. (Dec. 1986), Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Miami (Feb.
1988), Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Delaware (Feb. 1988), Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Memphis,
Tennessee (Feb. 1988), Coca-Cola Bottler in Jacksonville, Texas (Mar. 1988), and Coca-Cola
Bottler in Wauchula, Florida (Mar. 1988). TOLLISON ET AL., supra note 83, at 191-93.
184. In this period, Coca-Cola purchased'its largest bottling franchise from the JTL Cor-
poration for $1.4 billion and the bottling operations of Beatrice Companies for $1 billion.
OLIVER, supra note 15, at 191. To give some perspective, in 1980 Coca-Cola's entire invest-
ment in company-owned bottling facilities was $2 billion. House Judiciary Hearings, supra
note 14, at 217 (testimony of J. Lucian Smith, Director and former President, Coca-Cola
Co.).
185. See A Year in the Life, BEVERAGE WORLD, Oct. 1989, at 58, 61-62 (interview with Ira
C. "Ike" Herbert, President, Coca-Cola USA).
186. ToLLisoN ET AL., supra note 83, at 113 n.10.
187. A Year in the Life, supra note 185, at 58, 61 (interview with Ira C. "Ike" Herbert).
188. An exception is the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of New York Inc. PepsiCo, Inc. owned
the local bottler for years until 1984, when it was sold to a private party. Thomas J. Maier,
A Federal Case of Soda; Distributors Sue Bottler to Open Up Market, NEWSDAY, Jan. 28,
1991, at 29. The reason for the transaction, characterized as unusual by industry observers,
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cent of its bottlers and was responsible for some twenty percent of
bottlers' sales by volume.8 9 At the Soft Drink Act hearings a Pep-
siCo, Inc. spokesperson promised that independent bottlers were
not at risk from the company: "Bottlers are not threatened by
company-owned plants at the present time. They would not be
threatened if the Congress, in its wisdom, passed [the Soft Drink
Act]. Nor would they be threatened in the future if these territo-
ries are preserved.' 1 0 Through the 1980s PepsiCo bought a num-
ber of bottlers, 191 spending over $2.2 billion on two 1988 transac-
tions alone. 92 By 1989, Pepsi-Cola's wholly owned bottling
operations directly controlled over forty-nine percent of its domes-
apparently was that PepsiCo, Inc. ran into a force with which it did not want to deal: the
Teamsters. Id.
189. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 238 (testimony of Cartha DeLoach,
Vice President for Corporate Affairs, PepsiCo, Inc.). PepsiCo had initially owned bottling
plants as a means of establishing a presence in important markets where an independent
bottler presence was not available. PepsiCo, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 680, 688 (1975), rev'd sub nom.
Coca-Cola Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In 1975 PepsiCo
operated approximately 20 such plants. Id.
190. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 239 (testimony of Cartha DeLoach).
191. PepsiCo acquired the following bottlers since passage of the Soft Drink Act: Bryant
Beverages (May 1982), Surfside Beverage Corp. (June 1983), Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co. (May 1985) (sold Sept. 1988), Franklin Bottling Co. (July 1985), Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Company of Perry, Inc. (Feb. 1986), MEI Corp. (May 1986), Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company
of Gallup (Mar. 1986), New Century Beverage Co. (Dec. 1986), TJF Beverages, Inc. (Dec.
1986), Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Bloomington, Inc. (Oct. 1987), Rogers Beverages
(Nov. 1987), IC Industries, Inc. (Dec. 1987) (20% joint venture), Pepsi-Cola Bottling Com-
pany of Tampa (Feb. 1988), Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Annapolis, Inc. (July 1988),
Grand Metropolitan P.L.C. (Aug. 1988), Atlantic Soft Drink Co. of South Carolina (Aug.
1988), Pepsi-Cola San Joaquin Bottling Co. (Aug. 1988), Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of
Denver (Aug. 1988), Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Greeley (Aug. 1988), Astro Canners,
Inc. (Aug. 1988), Confair Bottling Co., Inc. (Sept. 1988), Laurel Group Limited (Oct. 1988),
Erie Bottling Corporation (Oct. 1988), Unibev, Inc. (Oct. 1988), Wilchart, Ltd. (Oct. 1988),
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Wilmington, Inc. (Oct. 1988), Southwest Beverage Corp.
(Feb. 1989), General Cinema Beverages Corp. (Mar. 1989), Pepsi-Cola Bottling of Reading
(Apr. 1989), and Rice Bottling Enterprises, Inc. (May 1989). TOLLISON ET AL., supra note 83,
at 191-93.
192. Robert J. Cole, Pepsico to Acquire Big Bottler, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1988, at Dl. In
one 1989 transaction, PepsiCo paid $1.5 billion and bought General Cinema's bottling oper-
ations, id., which at the time accounted for 8.3% of national Pepsi-Cola production, bring-
ing PepsiCo's control to 49% of domestic Pepsi-Cola production. Id. at D3. Incidentally, the
General Cinema purchase gave PepsiCo an additional 6.6% of national Dr. Pepper produc-
tion and 3.2% of national 7-Up production. Id. Also in 1988, PepsiCo paid $705 million for
the bottling operations of Grand Metropolitan P.L.C. Id. at D1.
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tic volume.193 In addition, Pepsi has had minority interests in a
number of "independent" Pepsi franchisees.9 4 A 1991 study re-
vealed that a sixty-five percent share of the market is served by
bottlers in which PepsiCo has an equity interest.
195
As stark as the numbers are, the underlying reality is even
worse. Historically, the value of dispersed economic power in
smaller, local units of production was truly realized in the soft
drink industry. In many small and medium-sized towns, especially
in the South, the local Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola bottlers were sig-
nificant participants in the local economy and substantial employ-
ers. 96 The concentration of the soft drink industry, through for-
ward integration and the entry of conglomerates, has ended that
193. Bruce Oman, Whole Lotta Shakin', BEVERAGE WORLD, Oct. 1989, at 219, 219.
194. Bill Richards, PepsiCo Inc., IC Industries Set Venture, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1987,
at 2. One example is the "joint venture" of PepsiCo and IC Industries, which grew out of an
acrimonious dispute over the transfer of a Pepsi-Cola franchise. Id. That situation arose
when GenCorp, an existing Pepsi-Cola franchisee, attempted to transfer a $395 million
franchise to IC Industries without PepsiCo approval. Id. PepsiCo blocked the transfer and
was sued by both parties to the putative sale, who claimed that PepsiCo was using its
claimed approval right to force a sale of the franchise to PepsiCo. Id. In a surprise settle-
ment of the case, PepsiCo and IC Industries agreed to joint ownership of a corporate entity,
into which PepsiCo put $177 million and two franchises valued at $77 million, and into
which IC Industries put two bottling operations. Id. The combined entity would have an
estimated 12% of Pepsi-Cola's domestic sales, making it the second largest bottler in the
Pepsi-Cola system. The largest, PepsiCo's wholly owned operation, then accounted for 33%
of domestic Pepsi sales volume. Id.
195. ToLLIsoN Er AL., supra note 83, at 113 n.10.
196. [The local bottlers] are heirs not only to a happy tradition which has seen
each succeeding generation more solidly entrenched in local business and civic
leadership in the place of their franchise, but also to one of the most lucrative
businesses in existence. In the 1920s and 1930s, the local Coca-Cola bottler in
towns and cities of the nation was high among, if not the highest of, the power-
and-wealth elite. This was particularly true in the South where World War I
industry barely dented the region's economic desolation and where the depres-
sion of the early 1930s hit particularly hard. In southern towns, the Coca-Cola
bottling plant was often the most splendid building in town, and the owner of
it likely also to be involved in banking, real estate, and other matters of high
finance-a strong element in an otherwise weak economy. Even amidst today's
affluence, bottlers are somebody special, and their relative power and financial
standing is little diminished, because the trend in recent years has been toward
consolidations, buying up other territories and building larger, fewer, faster
plants.
WA=rs, supra note 10, at 59.
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phenomenon in many places and has changed the basic relation-
ship between the business and the community. 197
Why did the industry undertake forward integration? It should
first be noted that in integrating forward the soft drink industry
has conformed to the pattern established in the marketing of other
foods.198 In the soft drink industry, changes in operations, specifi-
cally the introduction of high-speed, high-capacity production
lines, have fueled the impetus towards consolidation.' At the
same time, there has been a proliferation of products offered, both
in terms of product lines and container varieties, putting pressure
on small bottlers.200 The forward integration of territories permits
consolidation of production facilities and realization of scale econo-
mies in production."0 ' The reported savings from such consolida-
tions are quite large.20 2
197. Over 3,400 bottlers closed over a period of-about a 10-year period. But 90
percent of the ones that closed were the independents like myself. The Coke
bottlers, the small Coke bottlers and Pepsi bottlers are the ones that have been
bought out for very handsome prices. The large bottlers are not buying a bot-
tling operation. They take the bottling operation and close down the machin-
ery and throw the men out of work. All they want to buy is the exclusive terri-
tory marketing rights. The right to that territory.. . . What happens, the Coke
and Pepsi marketing effort in that area changes the characteristic from basi-
cally a returnable, reusable, hometown bottling operation to one that is ser-
viced with throwaway bottles and cans.
House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 60 (testimony of Peter Chokola, President,
Chokola Beverage Company, Wilkes-Barre, Pa., an independent bottler).
198. TOLLISON Er AL., supra note 83, at 110. ("[Clhanges occurring now in the soft drink
business have already taken place in the marketing of other food products. Soft drinks are
virtually the last major food product distributed through franchised dealers. The soft drink
industry is mimicking the natural economic development of the marketing of other food
products.")
199. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 78 (written statement of Dr. Louis W.
Stern, Northwestern University); Coke's First 100 Years, supra note 11, at 272; id. at 219-
20.
200. See House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 78-79 (written statement of Dr.
Louis W. Stern); TOLLISON ET AL., supra note 83, at 107-08.
201. TOLLISON ET AL., supra note 83, at 77. One provocative argument is that territorial
exclusivity hurt the small, independent bottler by limiting the bottler's market area, thereby
blocking the independent bottler's only path to expansion and realization of scale econo-
mies. House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 310 (testimony of Mark Silbergeld, Di-
rector, Consumers Union, Washington Office).
202. TOLLISON ET AL., supra note 83, at 108 (citing Walecia Konrad, Bottling is Hardly a
Classic for Coke, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 11, 1989 at 130, 130) ("Coca-Cola Enterprises reports
savings of more than $100 million in manufacturing and raw material expenses associated
with the con§olidation of acquired bottlers.").
19931 SOFT DRINK INTERBRAND COMPETITION ACT
Given the operational economies, it is not surprising that "[t]he
large majority of bottler consolidations have included the closing of
small, relatively inefficient bottling operations and the consolida-
tion of operations into larger, more efficient firms. 2 °s There are,
however, some powerful justifications for consolidation beyond the
direct production considerations, such as potential efficiencies in
terms of the internal operation of the system.204 For example, con-
solidation offers efficiencies in dealing with large customers with
operations across franchise territory boundaries 20 5 and in coordi-
nating advertising and promotional activities in multifranchise
markets.0 6 Consolidation also allows the national brands to "get
rid of the deadwood" among the bottlers.20 7 The forward integra-
tion of the national brands may even have a defensive element.
Faced with the increasing concentration of bottling activities from
a system of atomized small independents into a handful of large
independents with substantial bargaining power, Coca-Cola and
203. Id. at 107.
204. There are also potential economies from having one entity instead of two.
There are, of course, other cost savings associated with vertical integration [be-
yond production efficiencies]: lower transaction costs associated with the inter-
action between two independent organizations, more efficient coordination of
regional and national marketing strategies, more efficient coordination between
marketing programs and production plans, and more opportunities to intro-
duce new products or marketing concepts, among others. The economic logic of
these and other factors is that vertical integration solves problems arising from
the interrelatedness of activities where independent decision making leads to
potentially inefficient results. Arrangements such as vertical integration arise
to maximize the joint value of successive activities.
Id. at 109-10.
205. Id. at 108 (noting that efficiencies in bottler consolidation result from the need to
coordinate with large retail chains).
206. Id. at 77.
207. In his book, Pepsi-Cola President Roger Enrico addresses the question of why the
Coca-Cola system was integrated forward, giving some indication, one would assume, of why
Pepsi-Cola followed a parallel path:
When he took over in 1981, Roberto Goizueta was determined to change the
rules of the game and create a modernized Coca-Cola Company.
.. First, he restructured the company to get rid of the deadwood-mostly
third-generation bottlers who were so wealthy you couldn't get them off the
golf course.
ROGER ENRICO & JESSE KORNBLUTH, THE OTHER Guy BLINKED: How PEPSI WON THE COLA
WARS 7-8 (1986).
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Pepsi may have found it increasingly difficult to control the sys-
tem, thus opting for forward integration in response."'
Not all of the efficiencies require the consolidation of ownership
in the parent companies. Some of the production efficiencies can
be achieved through cooperative or joint venture production facili-
ties owned in common by a group of independent bottlers, by the
merger of franchise territories while retaining independent owner-
ship, or by the parent company's investment of equity in indepen-
dent bottlers to permit modernization. 20 9 There is also a fairness
argument against forward integration; the independent bottlers
made the national brands successful by virtue of their investment
of capital at critical junctures210 and by virtue of the hard work of
the individuals associated with the independents. As one indepen-
dent bottler put it, "[W] e brought them to the dance and now they
want to go home with someone else."' 21' Given the high (and in-
creasing) concentration at other levels of the soft drink industry,
however, a consolidation of bottler operations may have been
inevitable.21 2
208. See TOLLISON ET AL., supra note 83, at 110 ("Why would PepsiCo or Coca-Cola wish
to place their destiny in the hands of five or six large bottlers when they own the asset
around which the business is built?").
209. Scale economies are achieved through joint ventures, bottling co-ops, contract
bottling, and acquisitions. Coca-Cola and PepsiCo have been active in
refranchising their bottler networks in recent years, in part to hasten the
achievement of attainable scale economies. Refranchising encompasses a vari-
ety of activities on the part of the concentrate company: outright acquisition of
bottlers, equity investments, and financial assistance to independent mul-
tifranchise operations to assist them in mergers and acquisitions.
Id. at 77; see also COKE'S FIRST 100 YEARS, supra note 11, at 237 (quoting Roger Williams,
President, Keystone Coca-Cola Bottling Company, Pittston, Pa., who supports the consoli-
dation of bottling franchises).
210. ENRICO & KORNBLUTH, supra note 207, at 19-20 (noting significant Pepsi-Cola growth
during the 1950s due to bottler investment).
211. CoKE's FIRST 100 YEARS, supra note 11, at 226 (quoting Jack Bernabucci, Coca-Cola
Bottling Company of Jamestown, N.D.). The fairness argument may have had particular
appeal to bottlers who felt pressured to sell at a time when franchise values were rising at a
rapid rate. See ENRICO & KORNBLUTH, supra note 207, at 66-67 ("By 1986, the value of a
Pepsi franchise was increasing by more than 23 percent a year.").
212. The soft drink industry had a Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (a measure of concentra-
tion within a market) of 2,184 in 1981, at a time when the four largest firms had 75.7% of
total sales, and Coca-Cola and Pepsi together had 64.1% of sales. By 1988, the Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index had risen to 2,713, the four largest firms had 85.1% of total sales, and
Coca-Cola and Pepsi shared 71.3% of total sales. TOLLISON ET AL., supra note 83, at 1.
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As with the environmental goal, the soft drink industry may ar-
gue that it has met the economic goal of the Soft Drink Act, albeit
in a way not contemplated in 1980. Such an argument would re-
quire a rather disingenuous recharacterization of the economic ra-
tionale before Congress in 1980, from a small-business preservation
goal, to a goal of economic efficiency. At best, the industry can
make a plausible argument that the reorganization of the soft
drink industry has been efficiency creating. One study indicated
that a major acquisition by PepsiCo "was at worst competitively
neutral and in many instances was procompetitive. ' 1 3 Further-
more, the industry heavily promotes and discounts soft drinks,214
and the wholesale price has declined significantly over time.21 '5 The
problem with the substituted-performance argument is that the ef-
ficiency of the industry presumably would be enhanced by repeal
of the Soft Drink Act, which would allow the same sort of robust
competition on the intrabrand dimension that has characterized
the interbrand dimension.
Regardless of whether such an efficiency argument would have
merit, a fair reading of the 1980 debates surely indicates that the
goal was not efficiency; it was the preservation of the small busi-
nesses represented by the independent bottlers.16 If the soft drink
industry wants to come before Congress to argue that the continu-
ation of exclusive territories-in the present industry configuration
with intense concentration in large conglomerates and the parent
companies-justifies the extension of the Soft Drink Act, let them
come. Stripped of the small-business cloak, the nature of the con-
gressional debate-and the outcome-could be rather different this
time around.
Is the legislative history of the Soft Drink Act sufficient to
demonstrate that the soft drink industry and Congress struck a
213. Id. at 111 (discussing the MEI acquisition and the fact that, after the acquisition,
the volume of all carbonated soft drinks, including non-PepsiCo brands, increased in MEI
distribution areas).
214. See id. at 87 ("A majority of soft drink volume at both retail and wholesale is sold on
promotion.")
215. The wholesale price of soft drinks has declined (when controlled for Consumer Price
Index (CPI) increases) by over 30% in the 24 years from 1965 to 1988. When controlled for
CPI increase and cost changes, the wholesale price has decreased by 45.3% over the period
1965 to 1986. Id. at 10.
216. See supra notes 103-14 and accompanying text.
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bargain for refillable bottles and small-business preservation? In
the end it does not matter. If the industry and Congress struck
such a bargain, the promised benefits have not been realized and
the legislation should be repealed. If they did not strike such a
bargain, and the industry can suggest no other cognizable social
benefits, repeal is also justified.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. The Soft Drink Act
In the case of the Soft Drink Act, the public choice and public
interest analyses converge on the question of what should be done.
Either because it should not have been passed in the first place,
under the public choice analysis, or because it has not gained the
public benefits bargained for, under the public interest analysis,
the Soft Drink Act should be repealed. Presumably within the de-
bate on repeal, the soft drink industry would have a chance to pre-
sent an alternative public policy defense of the Soft Drink Act, ap-
propriate under the public interest analysis, but not likely
persuasive within the public choice discussion. The justifications
used at the time of passage-environmental protection through the
use of refillable bottles and small-business preservation through
the protection of the independent bottler community-effectively
have been eliminated by developments in the industry over the
last dozen years.
The public choice and public interest analyses may diverge, how-
ever, in predicting what will be done with the Soft Drink Act. If
there are no social welfare gains from the Soft Drink Act to coun-
terbalance its costs, the public interest analysis calls for repeal of
the statute and posits that at some level the right result eventually
will obtain.21 The public choice model is less sanguine."' In gen-
eral, one of six factors must change for the public choice analysis
to predict a change in the statutory equilibrium. As to the propo-
nents, the aggregate benefit of the rent-seeking statute may de-
217. It is acknowledged that "the public interest model ... is as much a goal as it is an
analysis." Mikva, supra note 54, at 169-70.
218. Given the misty outlines of the public interest prediction, the criticism that explain-
ing shifts in policy over time is particularly problematic for public choice analysis is perhaps
overstated. See Kelman, supra note 3, at 220.
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cline, the aggregate cost of maintaining the statute may increase,
or the composition of the benefitted group may change in such a
way as to introduce free-rider or other organizational problems; on
the other side, as to the opponents, the aggregate detriment of the
statute may increase, the aggregate cost of repeal may decrease, or
the composition of the burdened group may change in such a way
as to diminish organizational problems.219
The past twelve years have witnessed substantial changes in
some of these six factors relating to the Soft Drink Act. The pri-
mary change has been a shift in the composition of the proponent
group. The parent companies, who were not substantial players at
the bottler level in 1980, are central on that level today.220 The
conglomerates, who were a factor in 1980, remain strong.221 The
independent, local bottler community has been decimated.22 The
change in the composition of the bottler community alters the cal-
culation of both benefits and costs and the proponent group's abil-
ity to act.
As to the calculation of benefits, a significant shift may have oc-
curred in the position of the parent companies. A plausible argu-
ment can be made that, whereas in 1980 the parent companies may
have feared robust intrabrand competition at the local level, over
which they could have exercised little control,223 in the present sit-
uation the parent companies are well positioned to gain in a "walls
down" world. At the time the Soft Drink Act passed, some argued,
based in part on a calculation of the benefit to the parent compa-
nies from an open market, that the parent companies were not
219. Professor Kelman expresses a parallel thought in somewhat different terms:
[I]n the typical public choice story, at least one of two things must occur: gains
to the cartel must diminish from continued regulation, and/or gains from de-
regulation must become concentrated enough in some other group to overcome
free rider barriers to forming a countervailing self-interested pressure group. In
short, shifts in available producer or consumer surplus will alter the vote-maxi-
mizing coalitions.
Id.
220. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the changes in the
bottling industry since 1980.
221. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
223. See Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 572-79 (1975) (initial decision), revud, 91 F.T.C.
517, 607 (1978) (final decision), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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fully supportive of the Act.22 4 The situation of the parent compa-
nies has shifted significantly, making it more likely that they
would now favor, or at least not strenuously oppose, repeal.22 5
As to the calculation of costs, the political backing that made the
Soft Drink Act irresistible in 1980 has been weakened significantly.
By all accounts, the pressure from the nationwide network of local
bottlers was significant in 1980;226 there are hundreds fewer of such
small, local, independent bottlers today.227 Thus, even if sufficient
funds were available to promote retention of the Soft Drink Act,
224. One independent bottler was outspoken in his suspicion of the parent companies.
The fact is that the syrup manufacturers, although they were the only defend-
ants in the FTC proceedings, have everything to gain and nothing to lose from
the implementation of the Commission's decision. The bottlers' pervasive fear
is that their segment of the industry will be rapidly swallowed up by the syrup
manufacturers in an unstoppable rush to vertical integration and concentra-
tion; in a word, to oligopoly.
House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 14, at 50 (testimony of Richard W. Caudill, Vice
President, Central Investment Corp.). Mr. Caudill charged that the parent companies were
"tensely coiled. . . to spring to advantage in the post-FTC soft drink world," id. at 58, and
.that the parent companies "are poised to make the 30-year growth of oligopoly in the beer
industry look glacial by comparison." Id. at 50.
225. Although it would not factor into the public choice model, a potentially important
point should be noted: during the FTC action and the passage of the Soft Drink Act, indi-
viduals who had come up within the soft drink industry held senior management positions
at both Coca-Cola and Pepsi. See ENRICO & KORNBLUTH, supra note 207, at 6-7. An argu-
ment can be made that even in 1980, the smart business move for the syrup manufacturers
would have been to roll over on the Soft Drink Act, and that their apparently strong sup-
port of the Act stemmed as much from the emotional reaction of these senior managers as it
did from dispassionate business judgment.
Senior management positions at both companies are now firmly in the hands of individu-
als with substantial business backgrounds in areas other than the soft drink industry. More-
over, both holding companies are now diversified. The next time around, the parent compa-
nies may find it easier to yield. In this regard it is interesting to compare the remarks made
by the leaders of the two parent companies, who fairly can be said to represent this genera-
tional change in management. The first is a sentiment attributed to former Coca-Cola Presi-
dent and Board Chairman Robert W. Woodruff, the patriarch of the genteel past: "[Tlhere
could not be a conflict of interest between the bottlers and The Coca-Cola Company. If
there appeared to be one, somebody had made a wrong decision. The company and the
bottlers succeeded or failed mutually." WA=RS, supra note 10, at 133. The second is by
new-generation Pepsi-Cola President Roger Enrico, who characterized as "deadwood" some
of the "third-generation [Coca-Cola] bottlers who were so wealthy you couldn't get them off
the golf course." ENRICO & KORNBLUTH, supra note 207, at 7-8.
226. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
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the proponents would face a tougher situation because of a dimi-
nution of local voting support for the legislation.228
As to the shifting ability of the proponent group to act, there
may also have been a change. One clear advantage the soft drink
industry had in 1980 was preexisting organization.2 29 If one be-
lieves that the parent companies, and perhaps the large conglomer-
ates, have a diminished interest in territorial exclusivity, then the
ability of the Act's proponents to use the National Soft Drink As-
sociation may be curtailed. A loss of this preexisting organizational
base could impede the proponents substantially. At the same time,
changes in the composition of the likely opponent coalition may
have strengthened the possibilities for coordinated opposition. To
the extent business ownership generally has been concentrated
since 1980, one would expect to see greater coordination among the
Act's likely opponents. Interestingly, some opponents from 1980
have not forgotten the issue.230
In fairness, an alternative public choice scenario is equally plau-
sible. Faced with the possible repeal of the Act and the loss of ter-
ritorial exclusivity, the parent companies and independent con-
glomerates might conclude that the uncertainties of robust local
intrabrand competition are large enough, and the territories re-
maining in the hands of vulnerable small bottlers are marginal
enough, that the parents and conglomerates would prefer a modus
vivendi under which they would support retention of the Act. The
remaining small, independent bottlers certainly would gain from
such an arrangement; the consuming public certainly would lose.
B. The Public Choice Debate
The Soft Drink Act suggests both weaknesses and strengths of
the public choice model and indicates how the public choice analy-
sis can be used best. The public choice model is initially flawed in
its description of human behavior. The model is correctly chal-
228. See supra note 197 (discussing the effects of consolidation on communities).
229. See Tollison, supra note 68, at 342-43 ("[L]obbying for special legislation becomes a
relatively low-cost by-product of being organized.").
230. For example, the National Association of Attorneys General went on record in 1988
as favoring the repeal of the Soft Drink Act. Antitrust Resolutions Adopted at NAAG's
Winter Meeting, 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1395, at 1020, (Dec. 15, 1988).
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lenged as a gross oversimplification of an extremely complicated
reality; the motivations of political decisionmakers are far too
mixed and complicated to be profitably reduced to a one-dimen-
sional representation.3 1 Public choice proponents concede that
their model does not reflect reality accurately;232 they claim, how-
ever, that the model is close enough to the complex reality of deci-
sionmaking to be useful. 23 1 But when proponents of public choice
announce that they "seek a set of rules that will work well inde-
pendently of the behavioral postulates introduced, 2 3 4 they are re-
ally announcing that they model government without considering
its essence: the behavior of the people who control, support, and
are served by the enterprise. It is hardly surprising that such a
model is not very powerful.
This weakness of the public choice model is highlighted by the
scientistic illusion of the presentation.23 5 The public choice model
must be judged a failure on its own scientistic terms, because the
model's value as a predictive device has not been subjected to rig-
orous review.26 This is in part because some public choice propo-
nents do not wish to spend time refining or verifying the theory;237
231. See Mikva, supra note 54, at 169.
232. See, e.g., Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 1, at 188 (describing the model as not
necessarily the "most descriptive empirically").
233. The "close enough" determination also depends on the use to which the theory is to
be put. Professors Farber and Frickey correctly identify the difference between using a re-
ductionist explanation as an investigative tool and using such an explanation as a founda-
tion for the creation of public policy. Farber & Frickey, supra note 4, at 905. The former is
interesting, the latter is dangerous: "Although reductionism is sometimes a useful strategy
for the theorist seeking to construct an illuminating model, it is a dangerous foundation for
public policy." Id.
234. Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 1, at 188.
235. See Mikva, supra note 54, at 169-70.
236. For example, Professor Beermann tellingly examines historical flaws in Professor
Macey's public choice explanation of the Constitution. Beermann, supra note 59, at 210-11.
Macey's willingness to ignore the fact that large segments of society were dis-
enfranchised at the framing of the Constitution, especially when his own the-
ory requires that the likely "losers in future rent-seeking activities be included
in the process of constitutional formation," casts serious doubt on the rigor of
his economic analysis.
Id. at 211 n.83.
237. Professors Farber and Frickey, for example, criticize the public choice literature for
using unpersuasive evidence that a particular law favors a given economic group, and for
assuming that-even if such a result is identified-the law was passed due to the efforts of
the benefitted group. Farber & Frickey, supra note 4, at £95-96. For example, the Soft
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rather they are interested in exploring incentive structures and
proposing constitutional changes.2 38
The public choice analysis is equally flawed in its evaluative
function, beginning with the assumption that the world divides
into private and public transactions, a distinction Professor Kel-
man correctly argues is hopelessly ambiguous.23  Building upon
this error, the public choice proponents admit that there are exam-
ples of good public ordering-"wealth increasing governmental ac-
tivities."'240 But even on their own terms, the public choice propo-
nents are unable to identify this class fully 41 While proponents
acknowledge that there are positive social welfare implications of
some legislative transfers,242 their narrow definition of social wel-
fare-the increase in total wealth-coupled with their inability to
identify such transactions, means as a practical matter that all
public transactions are subordinated to all private transactions in
the public choice calculus. 43
Because economically and politically marginalized groups within
society have a rather small stake in the maintenance of enforce-
Drink Act clearly benefits the bottlers; however, whether it was passed due to their efforts
depends upon whether the reader believes that Congress was simply inept in pursuing its
ideological goals of environmental protection and small-business preservation, or that Con-
gress was pursuing a rent-seeking agenda.
238. This predilection is evident in the work of Professors Brennan and Buchanan, among
others: "The more appropriate use of the homo economzcus construction is to further the
normative exercise of investigating the incentive structures embodied in various institu-
tional forms rather than the descriptive exercise of providing predictions as to the likely
outcomes of political interactions." Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 1, at 180.
239. "The traditional distinctions drawn between the public and private spheres in the
mainstream political debates are quite unreal in the minds of Critics, both because the state
is explicitly implicated in all supposedly private arrangements and because coercive sover-
eignty is frequently exercised by supposedly private actors." Kelman, supra note 3, at 202
n.12.
240. See Macey, supra note 2, at 472.
241. Some public choice advocates admit the evaluative difficulty, albeit indirectly. Pro-
fessor Macey believes it unfortunate that "it is extremely difficult to distinguish between
those governmental activities that invqlve 'amorally redistributive' rent-seeking (and there-
fore should be prohibited) and those that represent wealth-increasing 'public interest' gov-
ernmental activities (and therefore should be encouraged)." Id. at 472-73.
242. See id. at 515-16. Macey allows that "providing a responsible yet coercive enforce-
ment mechanisfn for privately negotiated contracts" is often indistinguishable from a
"wealth-increasing 'public interest' governmental [activity]." Id. at 472 & n.8.
243. See Beermann, supra note 59, at 198 (complainig that "Macey does not make an
effort to distinguish desirable from undesirable government action").
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ment mechamsms for privately negotiated contracts, the expendi-
ture of public funds to maintain such structures is not neutral and
is, in itself, redistributive.2 " This is not to say that such "wealth-
increasing public interest governmental activity" is inappropriate.
Rather, it is an observation that political analysis that condemns a
cash payment to a mother to buy food for a baby as "amorally
redistributive," while approving as wealth increasing governmental
expenditures to resolve disputes between wealthy investors, is at
the very least highly suspect.
Which brings us to the broader point: the constitutional public
choice analysis is unconvincing by virtue of its failure to differenti-
ate on moral grounds between nonwealth-increasing governmental
activities. The public choice assumption that the only appropriate
governmental activities are those that increase overall wealth of-
fends the popular notion of why government exists. We do not un-
dertake as a society to feed the hungry, educate those who cannot
read, and house the homeless-even to the inadequate extent we
presently do these things-because it is efficient or wealth maxi-
mizing to do so. We do these things because collectively we believe
society ought to. To the extent the public choice model is manipu-
lated to cast such activities as wealth maximizing, it is facile but
empty If the model is true to its assumptions and leads to the
conclusion that government ought not undertake these activities, it
is so far removed from the reality of this society as to be silly and
irrelevant.
This is not to say that the public choice analysis is wholly with-
out merit, or that there are not important lessons to be learned
from it. The issue is how to use public choice analysis. The history
of the Soft Drink Act indicates that the public choice suspicion of
and hostility to the use of public power for private ends is some-
times justified. If the complete hostility toward public ordering of
the public choice advocates is inappropriate, the sometimes too
trusting nature of some public interest proponents is equally un-
244. One can easily imagine that, when given a choice, a homeless person would opt to
spend $127 million on food and shelter for citizens similarly situated, rather than spend the
same amount of money to fund the Securities and Exchange Commission for fiscal year
1993. See Act of Oct. 6, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1828 (appropriating the SEC's
budget for fiscal year 1993). Not only can one imagine such a preference, the decision would
be wholly rational from the standpoint of such a marginalized individual.
[Vol. 34:337
SOFT DRINK INTERBRAND COMPETITION ACT
availing. The case of the Soft Drink Act also indicates that the
public choice analysis is correct when it tells us, once again, that
structure and procedure matter. If the flat incentive structure of
the public choice world is not in itself enough to explain behavior,
we are well advised to remember that the incentives to which the
public choice analysis points-economic return, votes, and
power-are important in the decisionmaking calculus of public
officials.
In the end, public choice analysis should be integrated into our
evaluation-if indeed it was ever really missing. As Professors
Frickey and Farber suggest, a "less grandiose version of the eco-
nomic theory" would be useful to the extent "the model could be
used to identify tendencies within the political system, but not to
explain all of politics. '245
But, if one accepts the possibility of a public interest motivation
behind legislative action, the fatal flaw in the Soft Drink Act was
something that the public choice critique does not address. The
flaw in the Soft Drink Act from the environmental standpoint was
timidity The survival of territorial exclusivity was one necessary
precondition for the survival of the refillable container, to be sure,
but it alone did not necessarily lead to the continued use of such
containers.246 Congress failed to require that the industry follow
through and provide the public good, and in the absence of a re-
quirement, the industry largely abandoned the refillable bottle.247
245. Farber & Frickey, supra note 4, at 900. "Rather than supporting reductionism, pub-
lic choice theory can provide some useful additions to the judicial tool box." Farber &
Frickey, supra note 116, at 469.
246. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
247. This flaw in the Soft Drink Act was the subject of debate. The Justice Department
noted the absence of a returnable bottle requirement in the legislation and suggested that
the matter be "addressed directly in a piece of legislation." House Judiciary Hearings,
supra note 14, at 24-25 (testimony of Richard J. Favretto, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice). The House Judiciary Committee had sev-
eral proposals before it to do exactly that. See zd. at 249-62. Representatives Weiss and
Stark proposed House Bill 7128 in an attempt to force the complete conversion to refil-
lables. Id. at 262. Representatives Jeffords and AuCom proposed a compromise that would
have required a rising percentage of refillables. Id. at 249-50 (testimony of Rep. AuCom)
(proposing an amendment to require bottlers to maintain 10% in year one, 20% in year two,
and 35% thereafter, to retain exclusivity). Neither proposal was seriously discussed, and
because of the rule under which the bill was brought to the floor, no amendments were
allowed.
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The Soft Drink Act was similarly flawed as a vehicle for protecting
the historical dispersion of economic power in the soft drink indus-
try into small, local units of production, and here too the flaw was
the result of the timidity of Congress. The survival of territorial
exclusivity was one necessary precondition for the survival of the
small, local bottler, to be sure, but it alone did not necessarily lead
to the continued existence of the independent bottler.2 4 Again,
Congress failed to require that the industry follow through and
provide the public good, and in the absence of a requirement, the
industry moved sharply away from its independent, small-business
heritage.249
There are lessons in the Soft Drink Act from both the public
interest and public choice analyses. From the public interest side
comes the lesson that we cannot be timid in our pursuit of social
gain. From the public choice side comes the warning that if we are
timid in our actions, the very mechanisms we establish to advance
social ends likely will be subverted toward ends that harm society
Professors Brennan and Buchanan identify the essential issue,
although they miss the answer. Those who reject the constitutional
public choice alternative, Brennan and Buchanan argue, "must ei-
ther model political man as he is and live with Schumpeterian de-
spair, or model man as he 'should be' and seek to make their
dreams come true."2 s5 To the "hardheaded, realistic, indeed cyni-
cal"25' advocates of constitutional public choice, the answer is
clear: public ordering should be minimized, and what government
remains should be structured to restrain egotistic maneuvering to
use government for private advantage. Because they fear the un-
248. See supra notes 166-95 and accompanying text.
249. The Senate had before it a proposal by Senator Metzenbaum to extend the provi-
sions of the Soft Drink Act to only bottlers with annual sales of $100 million or less and
assets of $50 million or less. 126 CONG. REc. 11,341 (1980) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
[T]his is the amendment that will separate the men from the boys. This will
separate the talkers from the actors. This amendment really says, in so
many words, that if honestly what you want to do is protect the small bottlers,
then pass this amendment and let the big boys fend for themselves. If you are
selling more than $100 million of soft drinks or other products, you ought to be
able to compete in the free enterprise system.
Id. at 11,340 (addressing Amendment No. 1761). The amendment was defeated by a vote of
89 to 4. Id. at 11,340-41.
250. Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 1, at 188-89.
251. Id. at 187.
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predictability of human behavior and the inefficiency of moral
decisionmaking, the public choice proponents construct a sterile
and powerless system which cannot possibly improve the human
condition.
The constitutional public choice model, built as it is without re-
gard for the full range of human behavior and morality, surely
ought not become the dominant paradigm by which the proper
sphere of social activity is defined.2 52 Government as social action,
properly constituted, should be an expression of the best and high-
est qualities of humanity, not the basest qualities. It ought to re-
flect our measure of how society should be, our hopes for how soci-
ety can be, and our collective willingness to dedicate resources to
doing what is right-not merely what is efficient. The public inter-
est model, as complex, flawed, and demanding of our attention as
it may be, is preferable as our primary paradigm because it embod-
ies the truth that "man's best measure of the universe is in his
hopes and his dreams, not his fears. ''253
252. The irony may be that the most valuable contribution of the public choice model is
to make the public interest analysis more powerful. "Public choice would accomplish some-
thing important if it could help the legal system redirect the political system toward acting
more in the public interest." Beermann, supra note 59, at 228.
253. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 39 (1974).
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